2.4 (Chicago, IL)

25

Counsel for Defendant

So, Mr. Cottrell.

THE COURT: Good morning. Please be seated.

This is an office conference. As such, we will dispense with the formalities of Court, counsel.

MR. COTTRELL: Good morning, Your Honor. Fred

Cottrell for the plaintiffs, my partner Chad Shandler. With

me at counsel table Mark Boland, Raja Saliba, and John

Scherling from Sughrue Mion. And, Your Honor, in-house

counsel from CNH, in the first row, Emily Lawrence and Mike

Harms (phonetic), Your Honor.

Thank you.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. HORWITZ: Good morning, Your Honor. With me at counsel table today, Mark Durbin on the end, Peter Moore, and William Ward, all from Wildman Harrold. And then in the back, Brian Callen (phonetic), chief operating officer of Kinze, and also Christine Clifford, who is a paralegal with Wildman Harrold.

THE COURT: Welcome. Frankly, I am always glad to see clients show up at these things. I think it makes a ton of sense.

Let me just give you an outline of how I intend to proceed. The first order of business will be your various motions in limine, which, by the way, have inspired me. It's a new year, I think it's time for some new

procedures around here. You can report to your Delaware counsel, gentlemen, I am going to start reducing the number of permissible motions in limine to two a side. I may come to eventually eliminate them, as does Judge Robinson. They take up an inordinate amount of time toward, in my judgment, with all respect, not a whole lot of good result. We will talk about them nonetheless here today, however.

That will be forthcoming, for Delaware counsel's information.

We will talk about the motions in limine.

Hopefully, I will be able to rule on each of them. To the extent that I am unable to do that because I feel uncomfortable and feel that additional thought and/or process is necessary, we will do that, and I will issue a writing of some sort, usually a very short writing, disposing of the motion.

Then after that, it's pretty much with me a stream-of-consciousness affair. I have a number of items tabbed in your proposed pretrial order.

These are my law clerk and his successor, who, fortunately, is able to be here today, she will pick up this matter with me, and so we will have a nice transition.

Mr. Scherer and Ms. Sullivan Editor in Chief of the Villanova Law Review, and another very distinguished soon-to-be young lawyer on his way to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals after he leaves me.

We will go through the tabbed items. I don't think there is any controversy in the preliminary instructions, as I recall. I am going to have a suggestion for you with regard to the use of the video, rather than having me do an oral recitation of the constitutional basis of patents and all of that. We can talk about that.

We are not going to do final jury instructions today, nor will we address the competing verdict forms or the differing views on the verdict form.

We will do that later on.

I will go through some general nudges that I have, some do's and don'ts. Then I will open the floor, beginning with plaintiff, for discussion of the various items you might have on your mind.

That is how we will proceed.

I will probably just alternate on the motions in limine. It has been several days since I read these, so you will have to forgive me if my recollection suffers a bit.

I am, as a housekeeping matter, in receipt of your filing, and it's fine, wherein you propose an amendment to the proposed pretrial order having to do with exhibits.

It's filed at -- anyway, I will approve the amendment -- was this ECF-filed?

MR. COTTRELL: Last night, Your Honor. We

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

didn't have a chance to send it over last night, so we brought it over this morning. THE COURT: Ms. Walker will take care of whatever she does. MR. HORWITZ: Your Honor, on those documents, I think we had an agreement that there were some designations that they put in that document. As long as it is okay with the Court, we still have to put in objections to some designations. THE COURT: Okay. Do you want us to hold up on this? I think it's okay, either way. MR. HORWITZ: THE COURT: I am just concerned, as I would imagine you are, about the preservation of your objections, to the extent you need to do that. MR. DURBIN: Just with the holidays and the pretrial, we were focusing on this. It won't take us long. Early next week. THE COURT: Do you want to do another filing, which is more complete and comprehensive? That is fine. MR. DURBIN: That would be great. Thank you so much. THE COURT: Any objection? MR. COTTRELL: No objection. THE COURT: Do you want to just withdraw this?

It would probably be easier administratively.

MR. DURBIN: Sure.

THE COURT: And re-file it with the completed objections and whatever else needs to be attended. I will treat it as a motion. It's approved.

I had a note to myself, and I have designated Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine No. 1, which seeks to exclude evidence of Krause "Two-Hole Seed Cup Because It is Not Prior Art." I made a note to myself, for some reason, I don't recall exactly, that it might be appropriate to discuss this with Defendant's No. 3.

Does that resonate with anyone out there?

MR. DURBIN: Yes, Judge. Defendant's No. 3 relates to the issue of corroboration or the effort to swear behind Krause No. 2. I think that's probably why the Court saw that. Krause No. 2, the plaintiffs were seeking to exclude, in our motion, which is related to No. 3. We ask that the Court limit the suggestion of the invention date prior to April 25th of 1996. They both do relate to the Krause --

THE COURT: So Defense No. 3 really relates to Plaintiffs' No. 2, not Plaintiffs' No. 1.

MR. DURBIN: I am sorry.

MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, if I may. We think they are separate. And we think they can just briefly be

addressed serially.

THE COURT: That is fine. I had made that notation. I couldn't remember quite why I made it.

MR. BOLAND: There are some issues that are intertwined, but the precise relief being sought in each is quite separate.

THE COURT: Let me just take a look.

So, counsel, are you going to handle this?

MR. BOLAND: Yes, I will take No. 1.

THE COURT: So you will know and have some preview of what my thinking was at the time that I read this, the brief note I wrote was, It seems to me this is a question of fact for the jury, an objection that can be renewed later if there is an appropriate basis. That is where you are going.

MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, in a typical case where a defendant is trying to prove up something as prior art, it usually is an issue for the jury. What we have here from this Krause Company are several items that the defendants are offering. One of them is this particular two-hole device. And Krause started with a one-hole device that had a different structure, and it did not have a cutout in the bottom. It operated the way it did. We are going to contend it didn't work very well.

So Mr. Fink, the one engineer from Krause from

whom there is testimony so far in this case, and the only one on the witness list, and he is the only one we have, he says in early '96 the two-hole meter was put on these grain drills that were sold to customers. We don't dispute that grain drills were sold to customers in early '96. Our filing date is August of '96. We don't dispute that. But there is not a single document that shows what type of seed cup or seed meter was placed on those early '96 grain drills. All we have is Mr. Fink's testimony. And he said that. I asked him point-blank in his deposition:

Can you point to a single document, sir, that shows whether these particular grain drills from early '96 had the two-hole or something else?

And he said no.

And so we asked, All we have is your word, sir?
He said, Yes, that's correct.

The quotes are in our brief, Your Honor.

Where does that leave us?

We have some circumstantial evidence. We have some engineering drawings he did prior to this early '96 time frame. They are confidential. There is even a tooling quote. They got a quote to see how much it would cost to change the tooling to go to the other model. But that's not evidence of what was on the machine. So from what was on the machine itself, all we have is his word.

Couple that with the public documents at the time. We cited DX-503 and 504. One is a January '96 owner's manual. It still shows the one-hole. And one is from much later in '96, I think it's from November, and it shows the one-hole.

So the only documents available to the public, Your Honor, in 1996 that are in the record disclose the one-hole device. All we have is Mr. Fink's testimony that the two-hole device was used.

THE COURT: Which is uncorroborated, in your view.

MR. BOLAND: Yes. That is exactly the precise point that requires corroboration. The <a href="Finnigan">Finnigan</a> case, the Federal Circuit case, went on a long explanation of corroboration, and you are familiar with the rule of reason, of course. If the question is, does it apply when you have a single person from the public, regardless of his or her level of interest, testifying that a patent is invalid, the Federal Circuit said, without any doubt, yes, corroboration is required.

So the defendants cite a case, <u>Thompson</u>, that was distinguished by the <u>Finnigan</u> Court. And defendants say, well, no corroboration is required. We totally disagree.

Finnigan addressed the precise issue here of

public use by a third party.

Your Honor, we submit that Mr. Fink's testimony as a matter of law can't be corroborated on the record going to trial. That is the only issue we are asking for here, Your Honor. If the Court will agree with us, then the two-hole can't come in as prior art. And where you have a single person's testimony, and so he is put to the test of corroboration, we respectfully submit that the documentary trail needs to be entirely consistent. And here what we pointed out in our brief it is not.

What you have is the public documents at the time showing the old design. All we have is his word, his spoken word that the two-hole was used.

What we also have, Your Honor, is he changed his testimony from an affidavit filed earlier in the case. In the PI phase, the Court will recall, we brought a PI motion --

THE COURT: I won't recall. So go ahead.

MR. BOLAND: We brought a PI motion, and it was denied. One of the issues that the defendants raised was this Krause seed meter as prior art. They put in an affidavit from Mr. Fink. Mr. Fink said, Oh, here is a clear model of this two-hole seed meter. This was made in late 1995.

In cross-examination, when we later took

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

discovery in the fact discovery phase of the case, we said, When was this made? Where are the documents? I don't have any. When was it made? You can't point to any particular document that shows when this clear plastic model was made? No, I can't. And he says now, Well, I think it was most likely in the '96 time frame. So he has backed off of the '95 date. He is now saying probably '96. Your Honor, that is not clear and convincing evidence. So we are moving to exclude that clear plastic model. There is no clear and convincing evidence in the record whatsoever that it would qualify as prior art. So, Your Honor, in a nutshell, that is the basis for our Motion No. 1. It is a fairly narrow issue. We are not saying that in a normal case issues of proving up prior art by clear and convincing evidence don't go to the jury.

art by clear and convincing evidence don't go to the jury.

We are saying here, as a matter of law, there is one
person's testimony on the critical issue, the model is
undated, and there is inconsistent corroborated evidence, if
any.

Thank you.

THE COURT: What happened to the model that you

just mentioned?

MR. BOLAND: Kinze has put in photographs of this model they obtained from Krause. At some point in time Krause did go to this two-hole design. I don't know exactly when because it is not in the record, and it couldn't be determined through discovery.

At some point they made a model. Instead of being, I think, black plastic, which was their early commercial version of the one-hole, this clear model was intended to show customers at some point how it worked. But it's not dated.

Jumping ahead to one of our other motions, our position is, in general, if Kinze comes in with models or physical devices that haven't been dated, they are not admissible as prior art. They are just not prior art. So they are not relevant.

MR. DURBIN: Thank you, Judge.

We have a different view. We do think this is a factual issue. Obviously, the determination of whether it does qualify as prior art is a determination that will be made ultimately by the jury. We believe they are asking the Court to make that determination on their view of the record, which we disagree with.

THE COURT: Could you just focus on the argument he is making with regard to corroboration.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

MR. DURBIN: If I may, Judge. That is exactly where I am going. That is what I mean by the incomplete description of the record. The evidence shows this. Mr. Fink worked for a company called Krause. Krause developed a seed meter that had one hole. called the one-hole. And they sold a few of those. August of 1995 -- it is Exhibit B to our motion -- in fact, I have separate copies. THE COURT: I have it. MR. DURBIN: That one is blown up so you can see the date. THE COURT: Counsel, so you will know that my statement with regard to having read your briefs some time ago is not my effort to -- you shouldn't conclude from that that I haven't read the briefs. I have. It's simply that in the course of events I read them some time ago. You may have to refresh my recollection. MR. DURBIN: Fair enough, Judge. I think it's complicated, given the divergence we have between what the factual record is. Exhibit B is a design drawing that shows the two-hole seed pattern. It is dated on the front page August 14 of 1995. THE COURT: I am looking for the date, counsel.

MR. DURBIN: It is in the lower right corner.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DURBIN: Mr. Fink testified this is the drawing. By this time in August of '95 they had invented it and they had drawn it up and they were beginning the process of manufacturing it.

What we put to you next, Judge, which is Exhibit C, is the actual -- Mr. Fink testified to this -- is the purchase requisition. It is a collection of documents, the purchase requisition to have the tooling made to build the two-hole seed cup. You will see it is August 29th of 1995. Within that package, which you will also see, if you go, for example, to the page with Krause 213 on the bottom, Judge, you will see that is actually the requisition that preceded the purchase order from Allied Tool for the quote to change the parts. Then the purchase order was issued.

On the next page, you see an August 30th date from Acutek. This is the quote to actually make the parts, not just the tooling, but to make the parts. Again, this is August 30 of 1995. You have the purchase order on the next page to begin the parts on August 30th of 1995. Then after that you have some additional work orders relating to the development of the parts. In fact, Judge, you also have, I think this is valuable, a description, if I could take you back to the Allied Tool requisition quotation, on Page 213, they describe delivery of these tools in approximately 13 to

15 weeks, August of '95, which takes us into what Mr. Fink testified to, the beginning of '96.

Then he testified -- if you will go to Exhibit D, these are actual sales records of the Krause planters with the seed cups -- he testified that they sold six of them with the one-hole cup listed on this, then starting at the seventh one, which is March 29 of 1996, those all had the two-hole cup. All of that is perfectly consistent with his testimony that they invented it prior to August, they issued a requisition -- they asked for quotations, they issued purchase orders. They made the tooling. They made the parts. Then they were for sale.

It is not unsupported, as suggested. At a minimum, we have met the standard required to get this to the jury, Judge.

THE COURT: It seems to me, counsel for plaintiff, Mr. Boland, as is often the case, facts are in the eye of the beholder. In this case it would be the jury, it seems to me. Given that recitation, now my recollection is refreshed why was I not correct in my initial assessment announced that this is really a question for the jury, and that should it come to pass that you wish to interpose an additional objection, you would be given leave to do that and we could discuss it at sidebar, should it come to pass that there is not sufficient evidence, either direct and/or

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

circumstantial, from which to conclude that indeed this is prior art. In other words, I am not prepared to accept the view of counsel making attorney arguments, albeit, never mind how well made, that may lead me into preempting the fact-finder's role. It seems to me to be improvident and imprudent. I am going to deny the motion. MR. BOLAND: Thank you, Your Honor. Could I ask for clarification? THE COURT: What clarification do you need? MR. BOLAND: With respect to the clear model itself? THE COURT: It's not just the model, counsel. It's everything -- it may be perhaps other things that have been referenced just now by your opponent. Clearly, these are marked exhibits in the case. You will have a chance to cross-examine this gentleman, Mr. Fink I think it is. MR. BOLAND: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Should you establish it is not as a matter of law prior art because there is no corroboration, you will move at sidebar and I will rule. MR. BOLAND: Thank you. THE COURT: That is denied. Let's go to Defendant's No. 1. I think it was my impression at the time that

this was actually a couple of motions in one. Not true? I thought I recognized a Part A and a Part B. We are talking about the entire market value rule.

MR. DURBIN: Judge, what we have done is we have identified general clauses with the entire analysis and talk about a specific subclause, including the entire market value rule.

THE COURT: Bear with me a second, counsel.

MR. DURBIN: And a couple others.

THE COURT: I will tell you, Mr. Durbin, the shoe is now on the other foot, as it were. It again strikes me, this is a matter better left to the jury's consideration and not one in which the Court should impose its will and judgment preemptively. Go ahead.

MR. DURBIN: So, Judge, the attacks have a couple different levels. I will focus on the specific ones, starting with the general description of a lack of a baseline, no real approach.

Let me focus specifically on the entire market value rule first, and a couple of specific points that need to be addressed.

We don't think the testimony should come in at all. But with respect to the entire market value rule, unlike the issue where the jury might -- this is one of those things, using referencing, if I can reference the

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Unilok versus Microsoft case, they talked about the entire market rule and they used the phrase it was improper to let it in because once the cat is out of the bag you can't put it back in.

THE COURT: Did they say why you can't put it back in?

MR. DURBIN: Yes. Because the numbers become so big, once the jury has heard this large amount of revenue, this large amount of profit, you can't unring the bell.

THE COURT: Can the judge unring the bell?

MR. DURBIN: The judge tried and they said it wasn't good enough. What happened in that case is exactly what we are saying here. We have said that Mr. Napper, as a requirement, he is the expert, to use the entire market value rule, had to reach the conclusion, based on sufficient evidence, that the basis for customer demand of the entire plant -- keep in mind, Judge, the planter is as big as this It has a huge tool bar. It's got drives, mechanisms, room. roll units, wheels. And there is a seed meter that is one part of each row unit. And the patent relates to one part of the seed meter which is part of a roll unit which is part of a planter. And they kept ten percent on the whole thing. And we said you can't do that until you provide, as was said in Lucent and said again yesterday, until you provide and prove --

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: Can you give me the cite? MR. DURBIN: I will go to the website. The slip opinion --THE COURT: We will go on the website. MR. DURBIN: As the Court said, you have to establish first, before you can talk about this, that the basis for that entire planter is, in fact, the patented feature. So at his deposition, and he should not be allowed to contradict this, I asked Mr. Napper whether he had reached the conclusion that customer demand was, in fact, because of the patented features. THE COURT: Let me ask you this, counsel: the case that he shouldn't be allowed to contradict it or that you can attack any effort by him to contradict his testimony? MR. DURBIN: I would submit to you, Judge, that his analysis is, one, flawed because he had to reach his conclusion before he could do his analysis. And he testified -- I said: Did you reach a conclusion as to whether or not the patented functionality in this case is the reason that people are buying EdgeVac planters? I didn't reach that conclusion. Answer: discussed this before. I reached the conclusion that based upon what I understand to be the patented

functionalities described to me by their technical expert, Dr. Kaufman, the benefits of those patented functionalities and linking those benefits to essentially the proper placement of seed in the ground, spacing between the seeds as they are placed in the ground, and how relevant that is to farmers or customers making the purchase decision on the accused planters. I am not sure what that means, but I do know what the first sentence means. I didn't reach that conclusion.

So his analysis is flawed. And I can't unring the bell once he gets up and puts in this ten-percent number. There is no way. He didn't do an analysis. There is no other analysis. The actual license agreements relevant to this are on a per-meter basis, a buck a meter for prior improvements.

He didn't do the analysis. He didn't do an analysis based on the revenue related to just the seed meters, didn't do an analysis. All he did was, he took the biggest platform he could find and he did an analysis without reaching the conclusion required by Federal Circuit precedent.

So I would suggest that the analysis is flawed, and should not be allowed, and you can't unring the bell.

That is Point No. 1.

The second point I want to address is, again, the way he approached the analysis. In this case, from the beginning, or toward the end of the fall phase, at the preliminary injunction phase, the Court rejected the preliminary injunction and found there were substantial issues of infringement and invalidity. None of those claims are in the case here. But in the interim, there were from 12 to 280 claims. At the time of the expert reports -- and we are going to be talking about them here today -- there were 280 asserted claims.

We asked the plaintiff to reduce the number.

They refused. We encouraged the Court to encourage them to reduce the number. You said, I can't make you drop a claim, but you guys should think about. In response, they said, we will tell you when, but we will tell you after the experts are done.

That is important to a lot of the discussions.

What Mr. Napper did, even though he was under their control and could have known what they were actually going to assert, now it's 16, but it's actually 35 because of the dependent chain, so 35 we are fighting about now. He didn't evaluate any single claim, any single feature. He took the entire 280 claims. He evaluated the whole subdivision. He said all 280 are with ten percent of the entire planter.

And I said, well, you understand there might be found infringement of a valid claim of only one or a few of those? He said yes. We said, did you do any analysis as to any subset, any individual claim? No.

Now, Judge, as we sit here today, the only opinion he can offer is that all 280 claims are worth ten percent. But those claims are not even at issue anymore. We only have the claims that are being asserted.

In response, the plaintiffs have said all the features are basically the same. Let me stop and say, first of all, that could create some validity issues. But most importantly, he didn't offer that opinion. He didn't do that analysis. He cannot take that stand and say they are all the same. He didn't do it. Huge flaw, cannot be corrected. And I think he should be barred for that reason as well.

The last specific thing I need to raise with you, Judge, is he has done three different numbers. He has done an analysis of damages from when the patents, roughly when they were issued, from when the reexam certificates were issued and from when the lawsuit was filed. He did it when the lawsuit was filed because in this case it is undisputed, Judge, they didn't mark. They did not mark.

So we have said he should not, as I said, you can't unring the bell, he shouldn't be able to double the

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

damages and later on the Court say you got to cut that in half, you may have already heard that big number, he has already moved the chains as soon as he says that. He should not be allowed to talk about that.

We think at a minimum those three things should be barred. But effectively we think the best thing to do is knock out his opinion. There is one other thing he did. mentioned that the X rule license opinions in the case were typically on a per-seed-meter basis. There was one for a tool bar that was about one percent, and he opined ten percent. Actually, he originally opined 15 percent. After we pointed out some math errors, he dropped it to ten There is nothing that is even close to that, that actual license agreement between an interparty license agreement for 1500 patents, including these for four percent. But he said ten percent. And the only thing he could find to support that was a reference to the testimony in a prior lawsuit between these two parties about a different patent, different technology, and he relied on that as his ten-percent number. We don't think he should be allowed to talk about that, either, for a couple reasons. It is just confusing. We would have to re-try the damages in that case.

MR. SCHERLING: Your Honor, John Scherling for Kinze on this matter.

With respect to the entire market value rule
here, the evidence in the case, we put it in our case, it is
in our papers, from Mr. Napper's report and his disposition,
is that the meter in this case, the seed meters are critical
to the functioning of the planter. There is evidence that
Mr. Napper --

THE COURT: Could you address the quote?

MR. SCHERLING: I will get there, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You might want to get there now.

MR. SCHERLING: With respect to that quote that Mr. Napper did not reach that conclusion, Mr. Napper was referring to the conclusion the way Mr. Durbin phrased it in that question. And Mr. Napper understood it to be more of a direct one-step analysis, whereas Mr. Napper actually looked at this in more of a two-step analysis, where first he is looking at the benefits of the technology, the benefits of the seed meters, and linking that to proper seed spacing. Then he is looking at what is important to the farmers and what is relevant to the farmers in making their decisions to purchase planters. And accurate seed spacing is what is important to the farmers in purchasing the planters.

So I think you can't just view that one question and answer in isolation there, because if you look at earlier in the deposition, as Mr. Durbin quoted, Mr. Napper started out by saying, You have already covered this.

2.3

If you go back earlier in the deposition, that was in our papers, at Page 236 of the deposition, Mr. Napper clearly stated that the use of the patented functionality is the basis for a demand for the whole planter.

He said that in his deposition, that that is implicit throughout.

THE COURT: Let me stop you right there, because I want to get a reaction to that.

MR. DURBIN: I disagree. I believe that those questions were not as specific as this question. Frankly, Judge, I was confused. I thought for him to have done this analysis he must have reached the conclusion that these things were on the basis for demand. If you follow -- I hate to go backwards -- but beginning this chain of questioning that is allegedly out of context, I said:

Isn't part of the analysis, when you consider lost profits, to determine whether or not the patented component is the reason people are buying the overall device when you seek a royalty on the whole thing?

I said, Strike that.

I said, You understand that when you did your analysis, you had to reach a conclusion as to whether or not the reason people buy EdgeVac planters is because of the patented functionality that was at suit. Right? You had to reach a conclusion as to

2.3

whether or not that was what was motivating them to buy?

Page 253 of the deposition.

Answer -- interesting here: You would expect him to say yes, and I did. Here is what he said:

Answer: I had to review information that would suggest that one of a bases for demand of a customer or farmer making a purchase decision for the accused vacuum seed meter planters of Kinze was the proper placement of seed in the ground in terms of spacing, and that that has some bearing or relationship with the patented functionality at issue in order for me to determine -- just like Mr. Hoffman, from the last litigation, did in that case -- that the appropriate royalty base is the planter.

And I followed up and I said:

Did you reach a conclusion as to whether or not the patented functionality in this case is the reason that people are buying EdgeVac planters?

Answer: I didn't reach that conclusion. This is where we started. It couldn't be clearer.

Let me clarify this. This is not about the meter. This is not about -- I think they say in the briefs, the meter is the heart of the planter. Under the patents, we can have a meter. We can have a vacuum meter. He has to

actually say here is the improvements combined in these patents and those improvements are the reason that people are buying these. And he didn't say it.

THE COURT: Mr. Scherling.

MR. SCHERLING: Your Honor, I think that Mr.

Durbin has some cross-examination he can certainly use at trial for Mr. Napper. If you go back to Page 236 of the deposition, Mr. Napper does tie in the demand for the planter. There is a series of questions going on, but there is a question from Mr. Durbin:

What do you mean?

Mr. Napper talks about how the individual meters are not separately sellable, they don't sell them like that. That is information for a separate price for the vacuum meters. Then he goes on to the key point we are talking about here:

Based on my information, as to the patent

functionality -- what Mr. Durbin is talking about -
and the benefits of those, and the use of the patented

functionality as it relates to what customers are

interested in, and I believe it is the basis for the

demand for the whole planter.

THE COURT: That seems to squarely join -- Mr. Scherling, continue. I am only interrupting you because this seems to me, at least on this issue, to be a critical

point. I am trying to get it focused for me.

MR. SCHERLING: I think Mr. Durbin can reasonably make a case for Mr. Napper perhaps being ambiguous in that answer that he is relying on. But I think that this part of the record clearly shows that Mr. Napper is intending to mean -- and if there is something that was not understood in the deposition or whatever, there is clearly testimony in this case and information in Mr. Napper's report that the demand for the entire planter is based on the patented features. Those patented features are what improved the performance of the meter. The meter is the heart of the planter. The meter is what customers are looking for. They are looking for accurate seed spacing, and that is what drives the sales of these matters. That is what Mr. Napper said.

I believe it's the basis of the demand for the whole planter. It is there in the deposition.

THE COURT: Let me let you go on to the other parts of your opponent's argument.

MR. SCHERLING: Your Honor, on the entire market value rule, the <a href="Rite-Hite">Rite-Hite</a> case makes clear that, when the whole machine functions together, <a href="Rite-Hite">Rite-Hite</a> talks about, well, sometimes the entire market value rule might not apply if it is a convenience feature, a disadvantage. That's what we have here. We have here that this meter --

THE COURT: I am aware of the <a href="Rite-Hite">Rite-Hite</a> case. I am not aware of yesterday's case, but I am aware of that.

MR. SCHERLING: By the way, yesterday's case -- we have some extra copies of that case, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Wonderful.

MR. SCHERLING: Insofar as it bears on the entire market value rule, I would note that on Page 49 of the slip opinion there, the Court notes that UniLok conceded that customers do not buy Office Windows because of this product activation.

We are not making any such concession at all.

Mr. Napper says it's the basis for the whole planter. Our position has been very clear. It's the basis for the whole planter.

I would not read UniLok as changing anything with respect to the entire market value rule or our position in this case.

The last point on the entire market value rule besides <a href="Rite-Hite">Rite-Hite</a>, Your Honor, I would point out that the '193 patent in this case -- and we have claims from the '193 patent that specifically claim a planter apparatus, not just a seed meter, but the entire planter. So on the other point raised by Mr. Durbin, I believe he still is unhappy about the methodology Mr. Napper used referring to old calculations, et cetera. Mr. Napper's report is replete

with serious financial information. You have got operating profits, gross profits, pricing differentials between the different planters, gross margin differentials, research and development differentials between Kinze and Case. He has done a lot of quantitative as well as qualitative analysis applying the Georgia-Pacific factors in this case.

The <u>Hoffman</u> ten percent that he was referring to from the prior case. There was other litigation between Case and Kinze. Kinze's expert recommended a royalty of ten percent based on entire planter sales with respect to one feature of a planter. And Mr. Napper relies on that as a data point in this case.

Our view is, in very summed up sort, a summation of that is, that reflects the real-world situation that was existing at the time of what would be the hypothetical negotiation in this case. Same time period. Kinze is going on record, saying, we think this one feature in a planter is worth ten percent.

We believe Mr. Napper is entitled to consider that as something that was existing at the time of the hypothetical negotiation. Parties would be looking at that and taking that into account in this case in deciding what the royalty would be worth here.

As far as the asserted claims, Your Honor, it is perfectly normal procedure, we started with a lot of claims

and, working through discovery, we narrowed down our claims to a more manageable number for trial.

We don't believe there is any requirement of Mr. Napper to separately evaluate the value of each of those claims. Each of those claims contains the essential patented functionality that this whole case is about. So there is no need to break that down. There is no further claim-by-claim analysis required. If Mr. Durbin wants to cross-examine Mr. Napper on that, he certainly can. But each one of those claims contains what we are talking about. And if any one of those claims is infringed, our position is ten percent on the planter.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. SCHERLING: With respect to the notice periods, first of all, Your Honor, that is something that they raised in their letter briefing with respect to the motions for summary judgment. The Court just last week denied that. We think that is appropriate to go to the jury. There is a jury instructions on that.

THE COURT: Mr. Durbin.

MR. DURBIN: Judge, if I may.

Page -- referring to the term market value rule, the issue, again, I think you heard counsel say exactly what I think Mr. Napper was saying, which is that the meter is important, this is part of the meter, and therefore these

are important.

THE COURT: Here is the problem, Mr. Durbin.

You think I heard something. You really don't know what I heard. I believe that what I heard is two lawyers ably arguing, from a deposition record, differing sides of the same coin. I think what would be prudent for me to do is to have the testimony adduced in court, where I have benefited from a full exposition, through direct and cross-examination and redirect of that period. And should it come to pass that you want to renew your motion, I would entertain that argument at sidebar.

These rulings are without prejudice to the parties' individual ability to raise them anew, denied or granted, either way. The losing party gets a chance to say, Judge, here is why you should have ruled in our favor in the first place. You have now heard it.

I think the bell, frankly -- I disagree with you, Mr. Durbin. Even if I were to permit this to go without a reversal of my ruling, which I am going to, by the way, deny your motion, would permit -- because we are talking about damages, it can be undone by the judge at an appropriate time.

I will let you make your record.

MR. DURBIN: So we have argued with regard to the entire market value rule, so I will move on. I think I

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

need to address the additional points. This idea that the reference to Mr. Hoffman's testimony in prior litigation is acceptable because it represented the real world, I take issue with that. Not even close to real world. That's testimony of a litigation opinion in a different case that relied on this factual presumption, Judge. THE COURT: I worry about that. Go ahead. MR. DURBIN: Mr. Hoffman relied on and testified that what drove customer purchases --THE COURT: Is this the subject of a different motion as well? MR. DURBIN: It is also the subject of a different motion. THE COURT: Maybe we should discuss it at that time, because I do have a concern about reference to prior litigation. That's fine. I can defer the MR. DURBIN: discussion of that. THE COURT: The motion is denied except with respect to that part of the motion. MR. DURBIN: Can I finish on the last? THE COURT: Yes. MR. DURBIN: Individual claims and marketing,

Judge. He cannot be allowed to get on the stand and testify

1 that any individual -- he can't say that. 2 THE COURT: I need a more specific response than 3 you have given, Mr. Scherling, to Mr. Durbin's position on 4 that. 5 MR. SCHERLING: Well, Your Honor, I am not aware that any such claim-by-claim analysis --6 7 THE COURT: We are talking about marking. MR. DURBIN: I am talking about marking, too. 8 9 But I am talking about the idea that he valued 280 claims 10 and he did not do any individual analysis. 11 THE COURT: Then you need to react to Mr. 12 Scherling's point on that. 13 MR. DURBIN: My point on that is, Mr. Napper, he 14 offered no analysis of any of the individual claims or 15 features. You hear counsel's argument that all the features 16 are basically worth the same. Each individual claim is worth ten percent. That is not, that is not what Mr. Napper 17 18 said. He never opined on that. He never did that analysis. 19 I asked him specifically, at Page 217, 218 of the 20 deposition: 21 Question: Now, you understand that there are 22 hundreds of claims being asserted begins Kinze in this 23 lawsuit. Right? 24 Then there is an answer: 25 Do you want Mr. Stauffer to come back in?

He was excluded.

2.3

Answer: Hundreds of claims within the two asserted patents?

Question: Right.

Answer: Yes. I will characterize, there is lot of claims.

Question: You also recognize the jury could find infringement for some of the claims but not others. Right?

Answer: Yes.

And have you done anything to allocate among the claims, either individually or by groups, the value that is associated with those sets of claims?

I have not.

It is not in his report. It is not in his deposition. He didn't do it. And he did not reach the conclusion offered by counsel that each individual claim is worth ten percent. He cannot take the stand and say that.

He also, given that there is only 35 or 17, however you count it now, claims at issue in this case, should not be allowed to get up there and say, I will tell you that 280 claims are worth ten percent and, jury, you figure out what the individuals are. That is a fundamental problem with his analysis. It cannot be corrected.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. SCHERLING: Your Honor, it's implicit in Mr. Napper's report that he was saying, if any one of these claims was infringed, this is the royalty rate. THE COURT: What do you mean implicit? MR. SCHERLING: He did not break it down on a claim-by-claim basis. He just didn't do that. THE COURT: Your opponent is entitled to notice. Right? That is why the rule is crafted the way it is. MR. SCHERLING: Correct. And I think a fair reading of Mr. Napper's report -- it is surprising this is even brought up. It is a fair reading of Mr. Napper's report that these claims that we are talking about contain the patented functionalities we are talking about, which is the openings in the housing and the meter. All these claims contain that patented functionality. I don't think anybody would read Mr. Napper's report and not come away from that saying if any one of those claims is infringed -- that is where my Georgia-Pacific hypothetical negotiation factors --THE COURT: Mr. Durbin has come away with that Why don't you tell me, in the report, cite all of us to the location where there exists language from which that inference can be drawn in your expert report. MR. SCHERLING: Your Honor, I will grab Mr. Napper's report.

THE COURT: That is why we are here. Go ahead.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. SCHERLING: Your Honor, I would also point out that Mr. Napper relies on Mr. Caulfield, the technical expert. And that's clear from the report and from the deposition. THE COURT: That's fair. It just depends on what that technical expert -- what the gentleman is relying upon from that expert. I am not sure at this point. I am being a little less than clear. MR. SCHERLING: Mr. Napper relied on the entirety of Dr. Caulfield's reports in which Dr. Caulfield concludes that each one of these claims contains the patented functionality is infringed. And Mr. Napper clearly relied on all of that. So I may need a moment to find in the report --THE COURT: Why don't you go ahead and find it, yes. Do you know where it is? MR. DURBIN: No. I am quite certain it is not there, Judge. I will be excited to see it. THE COURT: Counsel, of course, you should keep in mind, that is why I alluded to the rule, of course, we are talking specifically about Rule 26 and its requirement that the report contain a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them.

MR. SCHERLING: Your Honor, the report clearly

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

talking about has those features.

is referring to the patents in suit. THE COURT: If it was that clear, I don't think we would be talking about this, Mr. Scherling. But you go ahead. MR. SCHERLING: Right. And in a big picture saying the patents in suit contain these features that we are talking about, that is very clear from his report. THE COURT: Let's find it. MR. SCHERLING: This is on Page 3 of his report --THE COURT: Do you have the report, Mr. Durbin? MR. DURBIN: Yes. MR. SCHERLING: He starts talking about his understanding of the technology, both of these patents relate to the seed metering technology. Then on Page 5 he starts going into the seed metering technology. The patents generally relate to vacuum seed meter technology. Page 6, he goes on to what the patents do, an important design feature related to the openings: And the openings allow the drawing of atmospheric air to promote the release of seeds. He deals with all of that in his report. are the features. Each one of these claims that we are

MR. DURBIN: Judge, that is an incredibly broad-brush suggestion of what each of these individual new and useful inventions must include. Some of these inventions that remain in this case are as specific as, they have openings, but they also have to have the seeds touch the edge of the disk. They have picked narrow claims, narrow claims to go after here, as a strategic point.

Mr. Napper was aware of that -- could have been aware of that at the time. We couldn't have been. And he chose not to do any analysis of the actual claims that are left in this case.

It is perfectly likely -- more than likely we think, Judge, we are going to knock out these openings. But it is possible, if we knock out for invalidity purposes all the ones about general openings, and find some little thing, something about the rim, where it is located, above or below the rim of the disk, there is no analysis of that invention. None. He didn't do it. He said exactly what is generally described here.

These all relate to seed metering, so they are all sort of the same. The fact of the matter is there are 17 unique and novel inventions going to trial. For him to get up on the stand he needs to have done the analysis and offer the opinion so we could then attack it and be prepared.

THE COURT: Do agree disagree with that general assertion?

MR. SCHERLING: There is one invention in this per patent. There is multiple claims relating to these inventions. But there is one invention, the seed meter, and these patented functionalities going to these seed matters.

Mr. Napper addressed this in detail. That functionality, the openings in the housing to promote the release of seeds that is present all these claims, it is that patented functionality which he focused on for his entire <a href="Georgia-Pacific">Georgia-Pacific</a> analysis, and looking at that is what is important to drive the sales of planters. That is what we would be talking about, and how much that improves the performance of the meters. That is throughout his report. That is the essence. He did not break it down on claim by claim by claim.

THE COURT: Was this discussed in his deposition by your opponent with him?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  SCHERLING: I think no more than we have heard, that I recall.

THE COURT: Final word.

MR. DURBIN: I asked him, did you do it, so I could go into it. He said no. And I was done. I don't know what else I could have asked him. He didn't do the analysis.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: But Mr. Scherling says he did. There is a fundamental disagreement as to what is at issue here, that is seed meters versus -- he says one invention, I think that is what he says, two inventions --MR. SCHERLING: Each patent is an invention. THE COURT: But not 17 separate. MR. SCHERLING: There is 17 claims. THE COURT: Mr. Durbin, do I misquote your position when, it seemed to me, you were suggesting there were a number of different inventions? MR. DURBIN: Absolutely, Judge. Each of one of these has independent features that have not been evaluated. The seed is touching the disk; the seed is below the rim; the seed is between the plane. And the openings have already been found not to be novel by the PTO. His concept is, he took every statement in Mr. Napper's report by definition, because he did no other analysis, relates to a subdivision of 280 housings. He didn't evaluate the value of any 17. THE COURT: I am not sure that is required. This is a little unfair, but you will be unfair as well. I will let Mr. Boland get in here. MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, just one minute. more familiar with the claims than Mr. Scherling. THE COURT: That is fine. Go ahead.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. BOLAND: Mr. Napper relied on Dr. Caulfield's report to make an assumption that if we show infringement at trial, here is my damages analysis. Napper is not technical. Caulfield is our technical expert. Dr. Caulfield went through the claims of each of the patents in suit in great detail, Your Honor. He laid out general comments about the advantages of each of the patents and the interrelation between the patents, and there is a lot interrelation between the claims. Even when Mr. Durbin and his team did all these claim charts in discovery and when they are attached to the expert reports, they start out by grouping all the features. There is group one claims, then they list all the common features, and then Mr. Durbin correctly notes, yes, some of them we selected narrow claims where there is an additional feature added. Your Honor, I have never seen a case where a damages expert was put to the task of going claim by claim and saying, I assessed \$200 if this claim is infringed. assessed \$500 --THE COURT: Hold on just a second. (Pause.) THE COURT: I believe I have heard enough to rule. At the most basic level and bottom line, I agree with

Mr. Boland's last comment. I don't, either, know of any

requirement that a damages expert be put to that level, the level you suggest, Mr. Durbin, of specificity. He is relying on a technical expert. He is entitled to do that.

You may disagree. But you will get a chance to discuss this with him. On the law, I don't think, at the end of the day, you are going to prevail with me on that issue.

I am going to deny the motion.

MR. DURBIN: If I may address, it is a Rule 26 issue, Judge.

Dr. Caulfield, they can't cite you any spot in his report where he talked about the value of the specific narrow features that are in the claims that are in suit.

There aren't.

THE COURT: Here is what I will let you do,
because we spent more time than I really wanted to on this
motion. I will let you talk about it with your opponent.

If it is not in the report, it is not in the report. I am
not talking about your take on what he was required to do,
because I don't agree with it. But you are entitled by Rule
26 to have a complete analysis to the extent that the law
requires the gentleman in this case, the damages expert, to
expound.

He is entitled to rely on the technical expert.

MR. DURBIN: Is Mr. Napper allowed to testify
that each individual claims has the same value as the 4280?

What is he allowed to say? I am not sure.

THE COURT: What do you intend to have him say,

Mr. Scherling?

MR. SCHERLING: Mr. Napper would testify that if any one of these claims were infringed, that it is worth ten percent of the planter.

THE COURT: Your reaction to that?

MR. DURBIN: It is not in the report. It is just not in there.

MR. SCHERLING: It is not in the report because there is no requirement that it be broken down like that, Your Honor.

MR. DURBIN: He could have said that. It just isn't true.

MR. SCHERLING: He did not need to say that.

They haven't pointed to a single case that says that a damages expert has to break it down like that. He is not required to do that. There would there would be no reason for him to put it in a report like that. I don't think I have ever seen a report like that.

THE COURT: If you have got a case, Mr. Durbin, that you want me to look at at some point that even comes close to your position, I will look at it. But right now, I am not persuaded.

Except as I started to say earlier for the issue

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

11

14

17

21

of the reference to prior litigation, I am denying the motion. MR. DURBIN: As to entire market value. THE COURT: Yes, as to entire market value. am denying the motion. MR. DURBIN: And marking? THE COURT: Mr. Scherling, either it is marked or not. MR. DURBIN: It is actually a stipulated fact 10 that it is not marked. THE COURT: So do you really want me to have to 12 wrestle with that? It seems to me to be a pretty clear 13 issue. MR. SCHERLING: Your Honor, our view, I think as 15 reflected in the Court's denial of the summary judgment 16 letter request, is that there are factual issues here. THE COURT: Regarding marking? 18 MR. SCHERLING: We did not mark the patent. 19 That is clear. But with respect to notice, there are a 20 number of factual issues here. Our position is that under the unique circumstances of this case, Kinze should be 22 deemed to have notice of this. We went through them in our 23 letter briefing that was before the Court on this issue, the 24 letter briefing this summer that the Court denied, at that 25 time, just last week. But we can go through that again.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

THE COURT: You can move again, Mr. Durbin, at Rule 50 or whenever. I am going to deny the motion. That ten-percent licensing, that other litigation issue, is that discussed in a separate section? MR. SCHERLING: That is a section in Motion No. That is where it was initially raised. 5, Your Honor. THE COURT: In Defendant's Motion 5? MR. DURBIN: It is raised in Motion 1 at Section --MR. SCHERLING: 1 and 5. They overlap. THE COURT: Section (c). MR. DURBIN: At 1. Then it is part of our Motion 5 regarding the referenced to other lawsuits. THE COURT: As to Motion 1, defendant's, the motion is denied except with respect to the issue that is raised in Subsection (c). It's denied. I am not going to revisit this issue in Defendant's No. 5. Your No. 5, Mr. Durbin, is a motion to exclude argument or evidence related to other lawsuits. MR. DURBIN: Yes, Judge. THE COURT: In addition to this. MR. DURBIN: Correct. There have been several instances throughout the case, starting from the original briefs, where the other lawsuit has been -- they tried to produce it. We believe since it is a different patent,

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

different technology, a lawsuit filed nine years ago, that there is no -- all it is going to do is create prejudice and confusion. We will be forced to retry the various issues, like this one. If they were allowed to talk about Corky Hoffman's opinion, we would have to call Corky Hoffman to say he concluded that what drove sales is the pivot transport. We have 19 hours, Judge. I don't have time to deal with that. It is unfair under 403. THE COURT: Who is going to handle this? MR. BOLAND: Mr. Scherling. THE COURT: Mr. Scherling, why is other litigation between the parties relevant? Why should it be relevant to this jury? MR. SCHERLING: Your Honor, that prior litigation focused on conduct and statements by Kinze, its counsel. And what are we are looking at -- we are not going to relitigate that case by any means. THE COURT: No. You are not going to get a chance to relitigate that case. MR. SCHERLING: There is very few items. case dealt with planters, just like this case. It was in

the time frame of the hypothetical negotiation.

THE COURT: Why, for instance, isn't there a

risk in referring to other litigation and the possible results or outcomes? Why don't we then run the risk of confusing the jury, of prejudicing the jury? The jury hears litigation. They hear rulings. They conclude that somehow there is some imprimatur placed upon whatever the result was from the other litigation.

It is usually problematic to have other litigation introduced in a case that really can stand on its own two feet, as it were.

MR. SCHERLING: There are certain aspects of that prior litigation that are not very pertinent to this litigation. As the Mendenhall case we cited in our papers recognized, there is nothing wrong with admitting evidence from or concerning prior litigation in a subsequent litigation. And certainly a cautionary instruction can be appropriate. For example, a one party won or lost instruction, that should not be taken into account in the subsequent case. But the Mendenhall case clearly gives guidance --

THE COURT: I would not give an instruction that one party won or lost, with due regard to my colleagues on the Circuit Court. They don't try cases. One has trial experience. With utmost respect, that would not be an instruction that this Judge would give. You wouldn't get a chance to have me give that, because I wouldn't let it in.

MR. SCHERLING: But the case does recognize it is appropriate to have evidence from prior litigation if it is relevant to the case at hand.

exercise in this case and may in this case exercise my discretion to exclude it, and never mind its relevance. If I am concerned about the prejudicial impact of the evidence, that encompasses many things. Tell me why in this case -- we are talking about In Limine No. 5, defendant's -- why I should let anything about prior litigation between these parties before this jury.

MR. SCHERLING: Your Honor, that prior litigation obviously concerned the same parties, it related to the same technology.

THE COURT: Why can't you independently prove up the things you need to prove and/or defend without reference to the prior litigation, counsel? That is what you need to tell me.

MR. SCHERLING: There are some facts in that prior litigation --

THE COURT: Tell me what they are.

MR. SCHERLING: The fact, for example, of the litigation itself goes directly to <a href="Georgia-Pacific">Georgia-Pacific</a> Factor No. 5. The competitive relations between these parties are specific Georgia-Pacific factors.

THE COURT: That is fair. Go ahead.

MR. SCHERLING: At the time period, we are looking at a hypothetical negotiation in this case of 2004. This case was filed in the early 2000s, I believe went to trial, the prior case, in 2005. The opinions of the damages experts in the prior case were given in 2004. They testified in 2005.

That is exactly in the time frame of the hypothetical negotiation in this case. When the parties --

THE COURT: You want the opinions of the damages experts in the 2004 or '5 litigation to be adduced before the jury?

MR. SCHERLING: We don't need to go into the details of those opinions. The important part is that Kinze at that time was taking the position that that planter technology in that case was worth ten percent. In this case, they have relied on other licenses for similar technology that they say relate to the same type of technology. There is a McCarthy license that relates to pivot type technology which is similar to what was in the previous case. Their own expert is relying on that type of technology in this case. So we can't say that it is not related technology.

It relates to planters. So generally, that case related to planters. It sets the stage of these parties

having a very serious competitive relationship. They were in a lawsuit. They were in a lawsuit. They were fighting each other.

Case is not going to be interested in licensing to a party that is suing them and it is a very hostile relationship. That is part of the environment that needs to be taken into account, specifically pursuant to Georgia-Pacific Factor 5.

There are a couple other isolated aspects from that case. One was touched on in the papers. The lawyer, Mr. Hill, in this for Kinze, he is the lawyer who has given opinions of counsel that they may be relying on in this case. They said they are going to be relying on opinions of counsel in this case.

Mr. Hill, in that previous case, was disqualified upon the motion of Case from representing Kinze. After he was disqualified, he then rendered the opinions that Kinze has said they are going to rely on in this case. We believe that disqualification order by the Court on a motion brought by Case would lead to bias. Certainly, we are able to argue, it is clear in the law, we can argue that there is bias of Mr. Hill in rendering his opinions, that he was not an objective opinion-giver. And the fact that Case moved to disqualify him and succeeded, he cannot be happy about that. Even to this day, as reflected

in his deposition, as we discussed in our papers, he still believes that was wrong, that Kinze went back on an agreement with him and Kinze should not have brought that motion and had him disqualified.

If Mr. Hill's opinions are going to be at issue in this case, we are clearly entitled to attack his bias.

THE COURT: I think a witness' bias should always be permitted to be placed on view to the jury. I think that is probably the least problematic. I don't have a real concern in that regard.

MR. SCHERLING: A couple of other last points, specific issues that were in our papers from the prior lawsuit, Your Honor.

Mr. Kinzenbaw testified in the prior lawsuit that Kinze had no interest in vacuum seeding technology. He did say that at the very same time that Kinze was actually developing the EdgeVac, and at the very same time they had concerns about infringement over the EdgeVac, they are developing the EdgeVac, they are about to launch the EdgeVac.

He is going on record, in deposition, in this prior case, saying, we don't have any interest in that vacuum medium technology. We really like what we have and we hope Case keeps doing what it has.

We believe we are entitled to put on that

evidence, Your Honor, of Mr. Kinze essentially trying to divert Case and trying to cover up what is really going on.

He was asked about that in this case and he said, well, I was just jerking their chain.

We believe that is important evidence that bears on willfulness in this case. It directly relates to Kinze, willfulness, and copying. Very important elements in this case. It is highly probative of willfulness.

The last point, specifically, we touched on in the papers about this, Your Honor, there was testimony in the prior case about Kinze's research and development. To us, that testimony is that Kinze does not put lot of money historically into research and development. The testimony at the time in that case about Kinze's lack of research and development was at the time the EdgeVac was being developed. So it is relevant to, in this case, Kinze was not putting a lot of R&D into developing the product in this case because they copied it from us.

So that evidence of Kinze's lack of research and development is very pertinent, again, to copying in this case --

THE COURT: That doesn't necessitate reference to prior litigation, does it? That they don't historically or weren't at the time engaged in developing, devoting a lot of resources to R&D?

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. SCHERLING: Your Honor, two points on that. One, under Rule 32(a)(8) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it specifically says that a deposition may be used in a later action involving the same subject matter between the same parties to the same extent as if taken in the latter action. That is what we have here. THE COURT: But he is going to be on the stand. The individual we are talking about, there will be Right? someone on the stand discussing this? MR. SCHERLING: We don't know who they will call. But under Rule 32(a)(8) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we are entitled to use that previous deposition testimony because it's the same parties, same subject matter. It's all fair game for us, Your Honor. It's particularly appropriate in this case because we have gotten very little from them on R&D at the time the EdgeVac was being developed. Their 30(b)(6) representative testified they don't break it down by project. THE COURT: I got you. Anything else? MR. SCHERLING: I am fine, Your Honor. you. I think what just happened here is MR. DURBIN: an example of why it shouldn't get in. It took them a very

short time to throw a whole bunch of stuff up, and for me at this time to show why every one of those things is wrong, it would take me the rest of the day.

Let me try to do it a little faster.

Point number one, it is not the same parties.

Mr. Kinzenbaw was not a party to that litigation.

Number two, it is not the same subject matter.

To say there is a lawsuit between two parties about planters means it is the same subject matter completely oversimplifies it.

That was a lawsuit about a specific patent.

That patent had nothing to do with seed meters. It had to
do with how you turn and rotate a planter and transport it.

It was, in fact, something that really does drive sales. It
was a very different case with a very different subject
matter. To suggest that these would be admissible for that
purpose, they fail to meet that burden to show the same
subject matter.

As to the R&D, already explored in this case.

Absolutely no reference to look into a prior litigation to talk about R&D. They have a full opportunity to explore it here. Instead they want to talk about what happened nine years ago in a different case. Inappropriate.

THE COURT: I think you reaffirmed what I thought I read earlier and as reflected in my notes, there

were different technologies involved?

MR. DURBIN: Absolutely, Judge. This didn't have to do with seed meters. They are talking about improvements, ways to improve where you put disks and the holes in a seed meter. This case was about, you got a 30-foot-long planter, how do you get through a fence? You pivot it. This is about the patent on that pivot.

Nothing to do with what we have here. Not the same subject matter.

With respect to Mr. Kinzenbaw, we very much disagree that he has been testifying inconsistently. We don't dispute that if he testified under oath in a proceeding and they can actually do a proper impeachment, then they can. But that didn't happen. And it's not going to happen here. That is irrelevant.

This issue of Mr. Hill is a great one. The Court began the discussion by saying juries make assumptions about rulings. That ruling in that case was very narrow and based on very specific facts, and it didn't disqualify him from doing work for Kinze against Case. It disqualified him from representing Kinze in that case against Case. That was a very specific ruling, one that probably wouldn't even have applied under the Rules of Professional Conduct before this Court. We can't explain any of that to the jury. All it will sound like is he is a bad guy.

THE COURT: Talk about bias.

MR. DURBIN: Here is how you prove bias: Did you work for Mr. Kinzenbaw for 40 years? Yes. Good client? Yes. Close friend? Yes.

There is plenty of evidence to prove bias by talking about his qualifications in a prior case than having to open up, under 403, wasting time, confusing the issues.

There is no reason for that.

As to the idea that the litigation itself is relevant to the damages calculation, there is no dispute that the parties are competitors. I guess, if the Court was willing to permit them to say they are competitors and they had prior litigation to show they are against each other, that is fine. But as soon as you step beyond that and start suggesting that that prior examiner's opinion about different technology at a different point in time, the jury starts extrapolating, the jury may make that leap, I have to call experts and point out the basis is different. That is wasting the Court's time and my time.

THE COURT: I agree with you, Mr. Durbin. I think this is a minefield, to permit these references, Mr. Scherling.

I am going to grant No. 5 and grant in part

Defendant's No. 1, in Subsection (c), the reference to

Subsection (c).

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

overview.

MR. SCHERLING: Your Honor, can we reserve on that to raise it again? THE COURT: As I said earlier, these rulings are without prejudice. The only advice I have for you and guidance I have for you is to exercise good, professional judgment as to what you seek to revisit with the Court. That's all I ask. MR. SCHERLING: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Let's go to Plaintiffs' 2. This is plodding along a little bit. I am going to pick up the pace, counsel. Here is my notation to myself, as to Plaintiffs' No. 2 to exclude certain physical devices and related evidence. I believe the reason I wrote this note is that I concurred at the time in my view of things with the defendants that you have offered plaintiff no supporting authority by way of case or rule for your contentions in your motion. I really think it is a question of weight, not admissibility. So I am not going to give you much time on this. MR. DURBIN: Your Honor, if I can do a quick

25 THE COURT: I am not sure that I need an

overview. But go ahead.

MR. DURBIN: We have very visual problems with the defendant's attempts to prove prior art and invalidity here. Where you have a patent and it's self-authenticating, everybody knows the date and everybody knows if it qualifies as prior art or not. But in this particular case, they are relying on physical meters as one example. One example in our motion is this Monosem meter. It's DX-35. Your Honor, they purchased it recently. There is no dispute. It was not manufactured before the filing dates. And so during discovery, I established through the Monosem witness that it is not identical to what was on sale --

THE COURT: So it is not prior art, in your view.

MR. DURBIN: It is not prior art.

THE COURT: How about that? I don't want to spend a lot of time on this.

MR. DURBIN: Absolutely. Mr. Bakker was examined extensively by Mr. Boland, then by members of our team. And he explained that there are distinctions, minor distinctions, such as ribs having the casing. None of it has any relevance to what we are talking about here.

He said it works the same.

MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, I pointed out in the motion, there was differences in the casting of the housing.

2.3

They added a rib to the cover. That is part of the housing.

There were changes to the plastic to affect the flow of
seeds, changes to the seed agitator, changes to the whole
configuration in the housing, gasket part of the assembly,
and a row pin with the bussing shaft.

What you are hearing is attorney argument. For them to try to come in with this Monosem and say, oh, well, this fairly represents the prior art, it was their burden to have, for example, a technical expert do a very discrete, strict identity comparison and show here is what was in the prior art and here is what Monosem has now, and these differences don't matter a hill of beans, Your Honor.

Our expert looked at it and said they do matter.

They would affect the performance of the meter.

We totally disagree with Mr. Durbin. All you are hearing is his arguments that these things are irrelevant.

To the extent Mr. Bakker said in his deposition that he thought they were minor or something, he has no idea what the issues in the case are, in our case, in terms of validity or infringement.

We think that Monosem meter simply should not come in. It's just not prior art.

And testing was done on it. We don't think that should be admissible either for that very reason.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

attorney argument.

MR. DURBIN:

would like, which says there were minor changes.

Plus, they have an old Monosem meter. They have one from 1989. We don't object to it. We are not looking to strip them of all their evidence. We want to make sure that what is presented to the jury was actually prior art and is not misleading or prejudicial. On Monosem, we simply don't think it should come in. With respect to the Deere meters, again, we are not objecting to all of them. But a few particular meters, we pointed out, they lack critical components. So this is a real, live --I don't want to have a mini-trial on THE COURT: It seems to me this should be something that counsel this. could get together on. MR. DURBIN: We think so, too. We think that this is all cross-examination for the weight, not admissibility. We have a difference of opinion on what Mr. Bakker said. THE COURT: I am not sure I agree on that. What resonates with me is what Mr. Boland just said. It is often the case that the Judge is confronted with really pure

I could read the testimony if you

THE COURT: Do you have a Monosem meter that is clearly prior art? What do you need the additional -- why do you need to gild the lily?

MR. DURBIN: It was during --

THE COURT: He can't take us down together. He is going to take down what I say.

MR. DURBIN: Certainly, Your Honor.

We have a Monosem meter that is attached to a row unit that was loaned to us by Monosem. It is very old.

What we have done -- in fact, you have a picture, you have a set of pictures as Exhibit G to our motion that shows that row unit and compares it to the one that was used, for example, for the testing. And you can flip through those and see, and I can show you the kind of changes we are talking about here, Judge.

Take, for example, Exhibit G in our response.

You can see on the left is the one that was the testing. On the right is the one that is on a row unit. Hard to take off or, frankly, that will break it. So we take it off there. It can't be used for things like testing.

The next page, see on the bottom left, that testing meter, in the lower right, you will see some lines, there are ribs added to the housing. Look at the one on the right. That is the ribs we are talking about. It has nothing to do with the openings in the device. There is no

evidence that it actually impacts performance. None

Dr. Caulfield, despite the statement, he didn't offer that opinion, whereas Mr. Bakker said there were minor improvements.

MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, that is attorney argument. The record is that there is no evidence that the changes would be immaterial or whatever the standard would be when a party tries to rely on non-prior art as prior art. There is no standard because people just don't do it.

The <u>Transclean</u> case that they cite in their brief, they say, people can rely on later things. In <u>Transclean</u> there were prior art machines. The question was whether the proponent of them could show that they had been unaltered. There were some alterations made. The proponent of them made a prima facie showing that the alterations were not significant or material to any issue in the case. And based on that showing, an evidentiary showing, properly supported --

THE COURT: You are saying we don't have that here. What we have is attorney argument.

MR. BOLAND: What we have is Mr. Durbin's argument. We have our expert testimony saying that it should be -- they would affect performance. The meter is not the same today. There is no dispute that it is not the same. It is just not prior art. So they want to bring it

in. And they have done testing on it.

We think it shouldn't be admissible, Your Honor.

MR. DURBIN: There is an evidentiary record -Dr. Stein, Mr. Bakker, the actual physical evaluation of the
devices. These are factual issues for the jury to decide,
is it prior art or is it not prior art? There are no
modifications. There is no testimony in this case to
suggest that these modifications had any impact on its
performance. None. Talk about attorney argument. That is
attorney argument.

We have the right to present the evidence to show, like Mr. Bakker's testimony, these were minor changes to the housing. They have nothing to do with what is claimed in the features. The jury will get to decide whether it is prior art or not.

MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, if I may. It is not prior art. The technical experts, to the extent they have addressed it, Dr. Stein, their technical expert, he did not. He did not make the showing.

What we have is Dr. Caulfield, Paragraphs 311 and 312 of his rebuttal report, he explains why the differences would affect the performance. We think it is entirely improper to admit a current-day device, go buy one off the Internet, come to court and say this violates a patent that was filed in 1996.

THE COURT: We are going to see whether they get to do that. I am going to let it in. This is a live issue as far as I am concerned. I am going to stick by my initial instincts, inclinations, after reading the briefs. I have not heard anything to persuade me otherwise.

Go ahead.

MR. BOLAND: On another issue on this motion, Your Honor. There is a whole category of what we called unidentified third-party meters and so on.

In discovery, we exchanged infringement contentions and invalidity contentions on set dates. We took discovery. And Kinze relies on certain Krause prior art, Monosem prior art, and John Deere prior art.

We subpoensed them in discovery. Third-party discovery happened. And a record was developed. After fact discovery was closed, we got their technical expert report, Dr. Stein. In his report, he now talks about 18 U.S. patents, a number of unidentified brochures, and perhaps five or six meters by Nodet, Gaspardo, Accord, which are European companies.

No model numbers were given. No exhibit numbers were given. There has been no record developed on them.

And he doesn't really even explain why he is relying on them. We think they are totally improper. They are not part of the invalidity contentions. They were not cited in

any claim charts attached to Dr. Stein's invalidity report.

So now what we get, after we file this motion in limine, on New Year's Eve we get a 282 notice from the defendants where now they have put in claim charts on all this prior art that doesn't appear in the reports.

Your Honor, I am flabbergasted. We have a moving target. They are adding new prior art on the eve of trial. I just think this is entirely improper, this entire category of evidence. There is no foundation, there is no proof that any of this is prior art, and there is no expert testimony on it.

MR. DURBIN: I think we have had a motion on this, but I will address it, Judge.

We couldn't disagree more strongly. Much of the prior art is actually cited, and the foundation has been laid in the testimony of their own inventors. These are the things their people testified and they reviewed in connection with their development of meters.

THE COURT: This is Category (d)?

MR. DURBIN: Yes. The documents and materials that are included are things that were in the prosecution history. The analysis of Dr. Stein is set forth in his invalidity report in great detail.

Part of what we have here, Judge, is more about what I would call the strategic choice of the plaintiffs to

assert 280 different claims throughout the course of this proceeding.

I would like to talk to you a little bit about, if I may present you with Dr. Stein's invalidity report, so you can get an idea --

THE COURT: Don't have time.

MR. DURBIN: Okay. I will make it visual. That is the claim chart cited for just one patent. The other one is in there. Three hundred pages of claim charts, 80 pages of text, where he specifically talks, for example, on Page 52 about these pieces of prior art they are talking about and how they relate to his claims. Then he goes through in excruciating detail on the Monosem, the Krause, and the Deere, then individual brochures, individual pieces of prior art, for every single element of 280 claims: Here is how the Monosm meets it; here is how the Deere meets it; here is how the Krause meets it. And you can obviously combine any of those because they all have the elements.

Anyway, my point is, they have been fully disclosed. The foundation is laid for fact witnesses, as well as discussion of the disputes in Dr. Stein's report, which is very extensive, Judge. To the extent there is any concern of confusion, our ability certainly to address this in an individual form was greatly enhanced when they decided after expert discovery was closed to take it from 280 down

1 to 16. THE COURT: Do you want to address the timing 2 3 problem. 4 MR. DURBIN: I am not sure what the timing 5 problem is. 6 THE COURT: The New Year's Eve... MR. DURBIN: That is the date it was due. 7 8 Everything in the -- there was nothing new in the 282 9 notice, Judge. 10 MR. BOLAND: Totally disagree. 11 THE COURT: Surprise, surprise. 12 MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, on the 280 claims, we 13 had a conversation with the Court, among many the Court has 14 had, I am sure, about midyear when they raised this point of 15 too many claims. Your Honor, those are our clients' 16 property rights. The number of claims in each of the 17 patents in suit is roughly 200. We found literal 18 infringement of a-hundred-and-some of each. It adds up to 19 280. 20 When we filed suit -- we would not be

When we filed suit -- we would not be representing our client properly if we didn't assert every claim that we found that was literally infringed. We thought we could have asserted more. But we put them out. Our expert did all the work. Our expert showed the literal infringement.

21

22

23

24

25

Their expert, they claim he did a thorough job on invalidity. And it was always with the view that after we saw how the case developed, how discovery developed, we saw their expert reports, we saw what their actual defenses were, we had every right to then for practical purposes narrow the list of claims for trial.

And we are down to 16, there is not 35.

Actually, we are contemplating, given the time constraints, as with any trial, we are contemplating even narrowing it further, so we can make a nice crisp presentation to the jury.

So the number of claims is neither here nor there.

What is here nor there is in the claim charts that relied on Krause, Monosem and Deere. There is no foundation. For example, they now are coming out with something called a Matermacc meter. And after the close of discovery in recent weeks, they have been making document productions to us with pictures of the Matermacc. And now there is claim charts in this 282 notice about a Matermacc meter and an Accord meter and a Wick meter. We don't know what they are. We don't know if they were even on sale in the U.S., if they were in public use in the U.S. These are European companies. There is just no record. There is no foundation.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: Mr. Boland, I am going to deny. Make your objections in realtime. MR. BOLAND: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: We will address them. Defendant's No. 2 I am going to deny. We need to move along. It is my view this is pure attorney argument. You are taking excerpts of testimony out of context. You can cross-examine the Plaintiffs' experts. There is no basis to conclude that the expert's opinion -for me to conclude, based on these submissions -- and I will not permit additional argument on this -- that Plaintiffs' argument is not scientifically based, and therefore unreliable. Your DOE argument is an attempt at summary judgment. And I will deny that as already having been rejected. That is the Court's ruling. MR. DURBIN: Your Honor, may I address one issue? THE COURT: No, you may not. When the Court says that's the Court's ruling, I am done. No. 4, defendant's motion to exclude opinions of plaintiffs' patent law experts, I have in big bold print: No patent law experts. I don't permit them in my Court. This motion is granted. MR. SALIBA: Your Honor, this is again --

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

THE COURT: They don't exist. They don't live on this earth, as far as I am concerned. They have no business here. I am the expert on patent law. MR. SALIBA: Your Honor, may I address one point on that issue? THE COURT: Yes. MR. SALIBA: What is at issue is willfulness, our charge of willfulness, and Kinze's reliance on opinions of counsel and whether the standard was appropriate or not, whether those opinions are competent. The question then is how does a jury get -- how is a jury able to benchmark whether those opinions are competent or not? THE COURT: You want to call an expert to say? MR. SALIBA: To discuss simply the competence of the opinions that were rendered back in 2004. We are not talking about their current litigation defense. We are talking about whether Mr. Hill's opinions on which Kinze is relying on are competent. And the jury, frankly, will not be able to make that assessment. THE COURT: Competence of opinions can be an issue. I agree with that. Just a word: Patent law expert, I have a visceral reaction to that. MR. SALIBA: I appreciate, that Your Honor. Back in July of this year you made that clear during a

discovery conference.

Mr. Osha is not a patent law expert. He is simply an expert opining on the competency of the opinion.

THE COURT: That is a different proposition. Go ahead.

MR. SALIBA: To the extent that Kinze's Motion in Limine No. 4 wants to take a broad-brush stroke and wipe out all his testimony, it is sweeping in Mr. Osha's opinions on the competency.

We would ask that the Court consider having his testimony.

MR. HORWITZ: Your Honor, I have this one.

He is a patent law expert. In their papers, they try to do two things. One, they say that he is talking about the reasonableness of what a corporation can do in the way that they consider the patents that are out there, the processes and everything else.

He has never been an inside counsel. He has been an outside counsel his entire career. Judge Jordan in one case, they tried to mention last summer when we had the first go-round on this, he allowed a person who was an in-house counsel and a chief patent counsel for several companies, that was the Oxford Gene case, to talk about the reasonableness of what the company did.

Here you have got an outside counsel who has

always been an outside counsel, he doesn't have the experience that even -- if you wanted to consider the issue the way Judge Jordan considered it, this isn't a person that can do it. He is just an outside counsel.

There is nothing more. We cited, I think it's great language from the Federal Circuit from 2008 in the <a href="Sundance">Sundance</a> case: It is no more than advocacy from the witness stand.

He is going to talk about the opinion, the substance of the opinion, what was done.

I said this when we met in July on the telephone: That is not the way it's done in this Court.

What is done in this Court is, when, either through deposition testimony or when somebody from our client is on the stand, they will say, well, you know, did you think of this, did you think of that, what about this, what about that, you do it through cross-examination. You don't put an expert on the stand who is just a lawyer. It is plain and simple.

This case is no different, Your Honor, than any other patent case. There are no arcane issues that would require a lawyer to get on the stand and talk about willfulness. We just shouldn't waste the time of the jury.

And, in fact, they have a motion as to an expert that we brought in, I think that one is No. 5, Mr. Nixon,

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

and we said in responding to that one, we only got an expert --THE COURT: I have eliminated the issue by banning both party's attorney experts. MR. HORWITZ: We only got ours because you said we will give them a motion in limine today. THE COURT: That is what I am going to do with this, Mr. Horwitz. I will ban both parties' attorney experts. MR. SALIBA: Is that also Mr. Kunin on Patent Office policies and procedures, which is different --THE COURT: It is out. It is not different, in my view. MR. HORWITZ: We took care of two motions. THE COURT: Right. No. 5 is Plaintiffs' motion to preclude certain testimony of Kinze's expert, Mr. Nixon. That is granted. And No. 4, defendant's motion is granted, a similar subject. I have in front of me Plaintiffs' No. 3, to exclude evidence of obviousness and to preclude Kinze from asserting a practicing prior art defense. Hold on. As to this Plaintiffs' 3, I am only going to hear argument on the practicing art issue. I am going to deny the motion in all other aspects.

MR. BOLAND:

I will address that, Your Honor.

On that practicing the prior art issue, our concern is that --

THE COURT: Just, Mr. Durbin, for your edification, my feeling about the balance of the motion is, I can handle these objections in realtime.

MR. BOLAND: I think I can follow that in your comments so far. And I appreciate it, Your Honor.

But the practicing the prior art, Your Honor, we all know if Kinze's accused product is strictly identical to some particular discrete item of prior art, regardless of any Federal Circuit case, that either doesn't infringe or it's invalid. But those aren't the facts.

What Dr. Stein, the technical expert, does in his report is he selects particular features of the EdgeVac, and he says, oh, this arcuate opening, it's known, and he points to some prior art. He does random elements, one at a time, and says, therefore, if it infringes it must be invalid.

Your Honor, we think that's wholly improper.

And we are asking that the Court exercise its proper discretion to simply keep infringement separate from validity. We are asking for an order that would bar testimony or argument, just like I said. Just because this particular feature may be known, that doesn't mean that the claim is either invalid or ties the two together, because

2.3

that's not the proper standard. And that would result in massive confusion to the jury.

MR. DURBIN: Your Honor, I will handle this one.

I disagree with what they are saying we are doing. We are not saying, we have never said that practicing the prior art is a defense to literal infringement. It gets into the case, because as you just pointed out, DOE is in the case. So it is coming in for that. It comes in for willfulness, so we can say those words if we want to. We haven't yet, but we can.

As to the specific point, it also comes in for inducement. They have a claim for inducement, it is relevant for that.

As to the specific things that Dr. Stein did, he didn't just randomly state that, therefore, it must be invalid. He said, plaintiffs have taken the position before the PTO and in this case that this is what an opening is. Then he says -- and they have taken the position that it is not in these six other pieces of prior art. And then he said, take a look at ours and decide whether it is an opening, not whether it is reflected in the prior art.

It is a credibility challenge to the very fundamental aspect of what they are claiming. I don't think we are actually going to have an issue at trial. They can raise it if we do. I think it should be denied at this

point.

THE COURT: I think it should be denied. If it should come to pass that we need to join this again, we will.

This is Defendant's No. 3 to exclude uncorroborated inventor testimony and incompetent evidence regarding date of conception.

MR. DURBIN: I will be brief, Judge.

We believe that there is a high risk of prejudice and confusion if they are allowed to suggest to the jury that they invented all of the elements of any of these 16 claims prior to the date we propose, which is April of 1996. There is no -- and you can look through their brief -- there is no testimony. The inventors themselves, they didn't know the precise date. So it is not even about corroborating if they didn't know. Then there is this one document, which is a big -- it is a drawing marked "obsolete," that they are attempting to interpret to determine a period or point in time where things were invented prior to the first entry on that sheet.

That drawing is Exhibit B to our motion. From what I have seen, the entirety of the support for a prior invention or earlier invention date is this document, and this is Exhibit B to our motion, and it has a date on it that it was created February 7th of 1995. You can't see, it

is down in that lower corner. Then the actual markings on here don't start till April 25th of 1996.

So they put on the stand a corporate rep, who was not working at the company at the time this happened, who said, well, since it's on there, it must have been invented before February 7th of 1995. Well, he has absolutely no foundation for that. He didn't even work at the company. He can't offer that testimony.

So we asked one of the actual inventors, John Stuckelbeam, what happened prior to April 25 of 1996? Can you tell from this drawing? And he said, no. Nobody can tell that. His testimony is very clear. I won't cite the Court to that, unless you want.

The fact of the matter is, if they are allowed to get up and argue that they invented it, we are going to spend a big part of the case trying to disprove that alleged invention, that not one witness or inventor even said that they can pinpoint the date that all of the features of each of the asserted claims is invented. And this document cannot fix that for them. They have no one who has a foundation that can explain the document.

THE COURT: Let me ask this. I think I denied Case's No. 1 today, did I not?

MR. DURBIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Here is the statement that I think

is most pertinent in your reply, Mr. Durbin. That is this: If CaseIH's Motion No. 1 is granted, which it was not, so let's go to the CaseIH's motion is denied, Kinze's motion should also be denied because CaseIH will prove at trial that the subject matter of most asserted claims was reduced to practice by spring 1995 prior to any work by Krause on its two-head design.

Go ahead, Mr. Durbin.

MR. DURBIN: I essentially proved that in the depositions. Quite a number of the Case inventors have left the company and they are on to different pursuits. There is one gentleman in particular, Lyle Dunham, who was heavily involved in this seed meter aspect of this new planter.

Unfortunately, the R&D group from Case has moved a couple times over the years. We couldn't find a hundred-percent complete set of all documentation that existed from those olden days. But we got enough.

So if it is proven at trial or shown to the jury at trial over what may be our residual objections then on this two-hole device, we are going to walk through the documents. And they start in 1994, and they go up through prior to this alleged Krause on-sale bar in the spring of '96.

The documents all summarize here, DX-62 is one set of engineering drawings that Mr. Durbin makes his

arguments about. He can make all the arguments he wants. What that shows is that the drawing started in February '95. We will walk through all the documents received then and show how the program got started, what the goals were, what some of the early work was, designing in the lab, how they were going to design the meter, trying different things, seeing what worked the best.

By the time you get up to February of '95, when that drawing was started, they had set out a pretty concrete design. That is what that reflects. And those holes were in there from the beginning. You can tell that because things that were added later have these little balloons drawn to them. We argued that in our paper. They didn't ask our 30(b)(6) designee the proper questions to elaborate on that.

Your Honor, I can assure the Court that we can come in and establish an actual reduction to practice by spring, summer, 1995 and again in February 1996. We have the proof to do it.

THE COURT: I will give you a chance to do that.

The motion is denied.

Finally, with regard to motions in limine, what interested me, the only thing that interested me in this motion, Mr. Boland, was I think Subsection (d).

MR. BOLAND: I am sorry, which particular

motion?

THE COURT: This is 4. This is the last of your motions, to exclude evidence relating to testing of seed meters.

My instinct or inclination after reading it was in the main the motion should be denied. But I will hear you on it. I was most interested in Subsection (d).

MR. BOLAND: In the PI phase, Your Honor, Kinze comes to the Court and says, there is no infringement because what we had done at the time is our expert, Dr. Caulfield, analyzed the EdgeVac. We picked half a dozen claims, maybe it was four or five, I don't remember, he did an infringement analysis. We found literal infringement. He did not test the EdgeVac, but he did a lot of analysis of it.

There is one important feature. You will hear a lot about it at trial. It is particular openings in either one side of the meter or the other or both that function to promote the release of seeds from this rotating disk at the desired spot.

So airflow inside the meter is important. And that would be a critical aspect at the trial.

In our PI proofs, Dr. Caulfield relied on Kinze documents, patents, and particularly a Kinze patent that relates directly to the EdgeVac, where, by Kinze's own

admissions, it functioned in the way and simply by looking at it and comparing it to the patent, you can see it.

Nonetheless if, Kinze comes back with its noninfringement case in the PI, and they attack us, they attack Dr.

Caulfield.

I have the heading from their brief: Dr.

Caulfield's Failure to Test the EdgeVac Renders His

Infringement Opinion Unreliable. They went so far as to

move to strike his declaration, which was this thick, and

lots of exhibits.

So that was the setup.

They came in with testing from their expert, Dr. Stein. It was lab testing. They took the EdgeVac and they put it on what's called a test stand in a lab. They mount it. They hook up a vacuum source to it. They run a bunch of seeds. Then you can measure the seed spacing and accuracy when you do that. The seeds go down, in their case, onto a grease belt. You can see how the accuracy looks.

They did the lab testing. And it had what we call this basic statistical analysis of standard deviations of the data and so on.

So the PI was denied. We moved on with the case.

Looking at the positions they took in the PI and

the representations that were made to the Court that testing is required to show infringement, Your Honor, Dr. Caulfield went to the Case people and studied up on these test stands in particular, mapped out a comprehensive testing program, and comes up with his own results. Without debating the merits of whose results are right or wrong, I think that is an issue for the jury and I think we are going to win.

But what Kinze then did is in its expert reports, Kinze tried to raise the bar. And after telling the Court and telling us in the PI phase that the industry standard only required lab testing, that they had met the industry standard, that their lab tests showed, improved their results to a degree of scientific certainty, a reasonable degree of scientific certainty.

Now they have come out and said, oh, no, you don't just have to do that. You have to take it another step. You have to hire a Ph.D. statistician. You have to conduct these things called inferential analyses and stuff that, honestly, Your Honor, I can't even understand. They are in this report by Dr. Stec. But they simply take the normal industry standard data that comes off these test stands and take it to another level of rigorous statistical analysis, and say if you are not doing that, what you are doing is just a biased eyeballing of the data. That is what they are accusing Caulfield of doing now, despite the fact

their own expert did that in the PI phase.

Your Honor, again, we think this is totally improper.

Our motion as a whole says they shouldn't be permitted to criticize Caulfield's data or analysis as not matching an industry standard because he didn't do this higher level analysis. I think the record is going to show at trial what the industry standard is. If we are going to do testing, we did it in the proper way.

Another point. Your Honor's concern about (d) I think is a very valid one, and that if Kinze takes the position that testing is required to show infringement, and even now they say a higher level of testing plus this high-level statistical analysis is required to show infringement, how could they possibly say prior art anticipates with no testing? They didn't do any testing on this Krause prior art or the Deere prior art.

Of course, Your Honor is well aware that infringement is shown by a preponderance of the evidence. They have a clear and convincing evidence standard to show invalidity. To meet a lower standard we have to do testing. Then for them to invalidate the patent, oh, there is no reason to test. They didn't do it.

We think it would be fundamentally unfair for Kinze to be permitted to go forward at trial and make those kinds of arguments and put on that kind of evidence.

Thank you.

THE COURT: I am going to take a moment and read this rather lengthy quote because I want you to react to it.

Then I will give Mr. Durbin a chance. I am at Page 5. It is their Subsection (d):

CaseIH argues that Kinze should be precluded from arguing invalidity with respect to the Deere meter and Krause seed cup because Kinze allegedly represented to this Court that to prove infringement of the asserted claims that the device in question must be tested.

I am going over much of what you said. But I want a more specific reaction. And, Kinze did not test either the Deere or Krause prior art devices.

Here is part of what confronted me in most of these motions in dealing with them. Again, this is a mischaracterization of the record. And clearly, I don't have the entire summary judgment record or discovery record before me. If I did, I wouldn't have the time to review it.

This is one of the reasons I am going to severely reduce the number of motions in limine that counsel will, going forward, be permitted to bring to this court in any event.

It was CaseIH's expert -- and that has been

2.3

manifest as well in the oral argument I have heard today from both sides, quite frankly.

It was Case IH's expert, not Dr. Stein,
who repeatedly testified he could not determine
whether openings in prior art meters met the claim
limitations without testing.

There is a citation.

That is what Kinze brought to this Court's attention, not that Dr. Stein required testing to analyze the product.

CaseIH's expert has since abandoned his unequivocal position that testing was required and now claims it is not (presumably because he didn't).

In any event, neither Case nor Dr. Stein has taken the position that prior art testing is required to prove invalidity. Thus, the very basis of CaseIH's motion is belied by the record, and the motion should be denied.

MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, we stand by our characterizations. I have read you a quote from the PI papers. Dr. Caulfield's failure to test the EdgeVac renders his opinion unreliable. They made arguments in their brief and moved to strike on no testing. This refers to the PI deposition. It was in 2009. At that point in time Dr. Caulfield had given his original declaration which I

explained did not include testing of the EdgeVac infringement, and we were relying on the presumption of validity and the fact that each patent had undergone reexamination. We weren't aware of any prior art that we felt was relevant to the claim. There was nothing to deal with the test.

It is not our burden to do any testing of prior art.

What these quotations came out of is a deposition which Mr. Durbin took, where he thrust in front of Dr. Caulfield certain physical meters, like this Monosem that I mentioned earlier, and started asking him questions. And Caulfield said, I have never seen this. I don't know what it is. I don't know how it works. I would have to study it. I would have to analyze it. I might even have to test it to answer your questions.

He was fending him off over the course of a long time, Your Honor, and he did it with multiple things that he hadn't seen or analyzed before.

As any expert would, he is simply going to respond, I am not giving you an opinion until I can do a full-length -- he is a professional engineer. I am not going to give you an off-the-cuff opinion. I have never seen this before. I have to study it.

In some of his answers, yes, I think he said I

may even have to test it. There is no record in this case anywhere where Dr. Caulfield said unequivocally it is a requirement to test prior art meters. That is the genesis of these quotes, Your Honor.

Our position relates to Kinze's behavior. I think it really can't be seriously disputed that they have moved to strike Caulfield because he didn't test the EdgeVac. And they claim now even higher levels of testing and analysis are required to show infringement and that Caulfield didn't do those. That's part of what we are going to hear at trial, is that Caulfield didn't do the statistical analysis of his testing.

So then our position falls back to the simple one which I argued to Your Honor. Under those circumstances, Your Honor, how could Kinze possibly be permitted to argue that the prior art does the same thing without testing when they have a higher burden than we do for infringement?

MR. DURBIN: Your Honor, simple. As said in our brief, we have never said -- Dr. Stein has never said that testing is required to prove invalidity. The motion to which they are referring, the motion to strike Dr. Caulfield's testimony, I would encourage the Court to read it. I know you are challenged for time. We challenged his analysis on two bases. One, he didn't do a claim

construction either now or in the prosecution history; and two, at the deposition, it's been conceded he said over and over, we cited a bunch of them, we need to know whether air is going to flow through a hole, and when it does I have to do testing. And he had done no testing on the EdgeVac. But he offered an opinion as to where the air went and where it was.

We brought that motion. The Court didn't grant that motion. But it wasn't based on Dr. Stein, our person saying you have to test. It was based on the fact that Caulfield himself said to do this I need to test. That was their motion. That motion was not granted.

That is in the past. At this point in time, both Dr. Caulfield and Dr. Stein have said it is possible to determine -- I don't know if Caulfield said invalidity or not -- but they said you can determine these things without testing. However, Dr. Stein has explained if you really want to know what is going to happen in the field, you got to test. It is an additional piece of evidence.

We have never taken the position you have to test or don't have to test.

THE COURT: Mr. Boland, how about that? He says they have not taken that position and they will not take that position in front of the jury.

MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, they argued that

Caulfield's opinions were unreliable because they didn't test. Our rebuttal to that is with respect to the EdgeVac, because we had the Kinze documents with their admissions, there was no need to for the EdgeVac. With certain meters --

THE COURT: I am going to interrupt. Given Mr. Durbin's assertion, I am going to deny the motion, and we will let you test before the jury. Okay?

MR. BOLAND: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Let's take a stretch break. And we will come back and deal with the rest of this.

(Recess taken.)

THE COURT: All right. Please, sit, counsel.

All right. So let's go through the matters I have tabbed. If I skip a page in the proposed -- I am in the proposed order section of your submission -- please, just call me back. The first point I saw was at Page 7, Paragraph H. This is under the heading Waivers of Claims and Defenses. Is there anything here we need to discuss?

MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, this largely derives from us. Kinze's pleading had laches, waiver/estoppel, unclean hands, and intervening rights. Those are notice pleadings. You don't need to go there unless you have inequitable conduct. Perhaps for unclean hands you do. We served an interrogatory: What is the basis for these

contentions? They gave the basis for other ones. They
never mentioned any of these specific defenses. As recently
as October, we got a supplementation with interrogatory
responses which never mentioned them, either.

We don't know what their theories are. We don't know what the contentions are, and we don't know what the proof is. We consider them waived. The first time they came up, when we were negotiating the pretrial order --

THE COURT: Let me help you a little bit. I think it's fair, so you will know that with which you must contend, but it is a procedural mechanism as described by Kinze to enable me to determine the remaining issues in the case. In that respect, Mr. Boland, we are in concert, as opposed to providing an additional means for a party, one or the other, to make additional legal argument on the issue of waiver.

So, Mr. Durbin, where are we on these?

MR. DURBIN: I believe, Judge, one, that we have properly disclosed them. Two, we properly answered the interrogatory. Three, all the facts have already been discovered. If at trial the Court concludes we haven't presented sufficient facts for the jury to be instructed, the Court will not instruct the jury.

THE COURT: You are saying these claims and defenses, to the extent there are claims, are still alive.

MR. DURBIN: Absolutely, Judge. They have been alive the whole time.

THE COURT: Intervening rights, obviousness I think is in there, laches.

MR. DURBIN: Yes. All of those, Judge, all in there.

MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, I would be happy to hand up the interrogatory response. This is the most recent supplementation, I believe:

State the basis for your contentions that the patents in suit are invalid and/or the plaintiffs' causes of action are barred.

And looking at the pleadings, we are talking about the, for example, the sixth defense: Plaintiffs' causes of action are barred by the doctrines of waiver and estoppel. Barred.

I may have handed up the prior response. But there is another one here, too.

For waiver or estoppel, Your Honor, the Court is aware of the law that silence, not suing the day that the patent comes out -- here we sued about a year after the reexam certificates came out. And Kinze had instituted the reexams. Some claims were amended and some claims retained their original form and scope, and a bunch of new claims were added.

So a year's period of time is not the type of rebuttable presumption of like six years for laches to kick in.

For estoppel to apply, there has to be some affirmative act that we wrote them a nasty letter and said you are infringing our patents --

of you. Mr. Durbin, you and your team correctly point out the reason for that requirement in my pretrial order. But the requirement is so that the Court knows, as much as your opponent, your opponent, that which is still at issue. I don't want to have to contemplate that there are issues that are not being seriously advanced. So I need to know.

MR. DURBIN: Your Honor, these issues are supported --

THE COURT: If there is going to be evidence adduced on these points, fine. To the extent that you are doing CYA litigation, excuse me crassness, I don't appreciate it.

MR. DURBIN: Judge, the evidence will show that they knew in 2004, they got on a plane with their lawyers to inspect our device, and sued us in 2008. During that period of time they were fully aware of what we were doing. During that period of time we relied on their failure to take any action to continue our efforts to developing the Monosem and

EdgeVac and marketing. That is just the beginning of the story. But that is enough to survive a motion for summary judgment, which is what this is right here.

THE COURT: I am not going to entertain a motion for summary judgment at this point, I made that clear. I am going to streamline the case to the extent possible.

Mr. Boland.

MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, if you look at the answers, none of them mention these defenses. So they are waived. There was no fact discovery on it. None of them are mentioned in any expert reports. So a lot of times the party puts in some defenses as sort of boilerplate and they fall out of the case.

THE COURT: That is what I meant when I said CYA.

MR. BOLAND: We were shocked to see proposed jury instructions on waiver and estoppel. What are the facts? In 2004 -- they came out with their machine in 2005. By that time both patents in suit were engaged in reexams at the Patent Office. We are not going to sue them based on claims that may be amended --

THE COURT: Mr. Boland, I don't think they are live issues. I don't think you are going to have to wrestle with them. We will leave it there.

MR. BOLAND: Under that section, one other point

briefly. There is a 102(g) defense based on this Krause two-hole. I don't deny that all through discovery we litigated a 102(a) defense based on the two-hole, less than a year before the filing date, was it known or in use. That was the issue. Discovery was taken. A lot of time and money was spent on that issue.

On October 22, the Friday night before the MILs were due Monday, October 25th, we get an updated interrogatory which now adds a 102(g) defense for the first time. We never heard of it. It wasn't litigated in discovery. It wasn't in any expert reports. So on the eve of the motions in limine, there is a brand-new defense.

Now, it is not identical to a 102(a) or (b). If I had known that actual reduction to practice was at issue, my deposition strategy at a minimum would have been different. They are trying to shoehorn in new defenses at the last minute. It is similar to this 282 notice.

THE COURT: Let's get a reaction.

MR. DURBIN: Strongly disagree.

Let's start with our discovery response, Judge.

They asked a question: If you wade through the whole
question and you understand it, you are a step ahead of me.

We responded. We said exactly at the top of our answer:

Kinze further objects to this as compound, confusing, and
comprising at least three discrete topics to the extent

Kinze can discern them. And we list them. They are invalidity. They are all inert defects of the patents, unavailability of the prior art, inequitable conduct. Very simple. Based on that understanding, here is all of the information. Never got a peep from them saying this is about laches and estoppel or waiver, because that is not what this interrogatory asks for. So we answered it fully.

As to 102(g) Judge, we had no idea they were going to come in here again and say there is no evidence, despite Jerome Fink's testimony that this thing was on sale in March of 1996 and it wasn't a sale, it wasn't invented, and it wasn't used to practice. And we are going to swear behind it.

As soon as that came up, we asserted the defense. It is exactly the way discovery is supposed to work. We replied in our answer 102. They knew that. They took full discovery on all of the issues they have. Each time some new information came up, we supplemented our answers. Each time new information came up, we supplemented with a new description of the evidence and the issues. It is exactly what you are supposed to do throughout discovery.

THE COURT: When did the supplementation occur?

MR. DURBIN: Four months ago.

MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, we served contention interrogatories, as in any standard case, why is the patent

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

invalid, why are our causes of action barred. I am looking at their fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh defenses, all this waiver and estoppel stuff, barred by the doctrine of intervening rights, barred by the doctrine of laches, barred by waiver and estoppel. We went right to that. They elected not to give us the facts. We didn't get the contentions. Mr. Durbin said, they limited it to certain prior art and inequitable conduct. We have been litigating Krause and Deere and Monosem. We have been litigating indefiniteness. We have been litigating written description --THE COURT: Let me ask you this: When you were put on notice as to the 102(g) issue, that was about four months ago? MR. BOLAND: That was October 22, 2010, Your Honor. THE COURT: That was subsequent to the close of fact and expert discovery. MR. BOLAND: Yes, subsequent to the close of fact and expert discovery, and on eve of motions in limine. MR. DURBIN: First of all, Judge, they were on notice. We pled 102. We didn't know how the case was going to shape out. THE COURT: When did you know you had 102(g)?

MR. DURBIN: We didn't know 102(q) was an issue

because the Krause served.

2.3

THE COURT: When was that?

MR. DURBIN: It was late, Judge. We thought they were -- we thought they were attacking this in a different way. But they took a lot of time with Mr. Fink. They got all the facts they needed. I don't think they can identify a fact they needed that they don't have.

THE COURT: Why don't you address Mr. Boland's contention that they would have approached their deposition strategy differently.

MR. DURBIN: I don't know how they could have approached it differently. The whole time they spent trying to change his testimony about what the document said, which would be the same thing as when it was invented. I don't know how that would have been any different.

As to expert discovery, it is a factual issue, it will be decided just like we talked about earlier with the Krause two-hole and the support for it. Those facts will be decided. Was it invented by August 1995? The same facts we talked about.

It is in a drawing. Was it reduced to practice with diligence? We looked at the invoices. We looked at the purchase requisitions. We looked at the tooling and the parts. The evidence is all the same evidence that would prove the exact same points.

MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, I respectfully disagree with that. To be clear, they were on notice from a long time ago, particularly when I took Mr. Fink's deposition.

They actually took it, I crossed them. The entire focus of my cross almost was on this two-hole and it wasn't on sale or public use until the time they were claiming surprise.

To claim surprise when they didn't know until recently somehow that we were going to raise an attack with the proof as prior art, I just can't agree with that.

Our motion in limine attacking it, our No. 1, which you denied today, didn't come till the Monday after we got this Friday 102(g).

Second, 102(g), yes, there are some overlapping facts. I don't deny that. We are talking about the same sphere of activities. But the proof of 102(g) involves different considerations. It is a relative comparison of one party's conception and one party's conception or one party's reduction to practice and the calculus of who was the first inventor.

And diligence can then come into play sometimes depending on the competing dates.

THE COURT: Let's wait and see. If there is a serious 102(g) issue that manifests itself, I will revisit that. In other words, the old "we will cross the bridge." You have preserved your position. You will get a chance.

MR. BOLAND: Thanks. Just to be clear, the other equitable defenses are out. Laches, estoppel --

THE COURT: No, no. That wasn't my ruling.

What I intended to say is I don't think they are being seriously advanced. Should that be the case, we will deal with that. I am not prepared at this point to rule that they have been waived.

MR. BOLAND: At a bare minimum, Your Honor, could we ask that these equitable defenses, such as intervening rights, to the extent they have a case on it, be taken up as part of any Bench trial that the Court might be contemplating? Because intervening rights is essentially --

THE COURT: I am not inclined to do that at this point, Mr. Boland. I am not going to go where I am inclined to go. I am really trying to resist that.

Inequitable conduct, I don't have a set practice. Whoever wrote this statement -- "Case understands that it is my general practice to hold a separate Bench trial," that is not the case. As Kinze correctly points out, I have done it different ways and don't have a set opinion that one way is better than the other. I am willing to listen to parties' views as to a particular case and why they do or do not think that a jury acting in an advisory role or the Court holding a separate Bench trial is preferable.

Mr. Boland.

MR. BOLAND: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.

We respectfully ask the Court to keep this issue out from the jury. The reason is simple. Claims of inequitable conduct essentially amount to allegations that the inventors, those involved in the prosecution committed a fraud. That is highly inflammatory. Your Honor, we submit that the prejudice that would result from trying this subject together with the other issues would severely prejudice our clients in this case.

I do think, respectfully, it would be proper for the Court to take into account the merits in determining whether to let it go to the jury or not. I think that there may well be cases where it's a close call, and the Court might benefit from having some advice from the jury in terms of the Court's ultimate ruling on issue.

Here, Your Honor, I am not asking for a summary judgment right now. But very briefly, we will establish that this Monosem prior art is fundamentally different and not material. I'm not even sure it is not relevant.

Putting that aside, Your Honor, in terms of the pleading that we are faced with, we don't think it even satisfies exigent standards for pleading on intent. Exigent says, Who? What? Where? When? What are the specific acts? There is three people they accuse in the pleading.

Mr. Gerasimow from the Case Patent Department and two attorneys who prosecuted the reexamination.

And the two attorneys who prosecuted the reexamination, Your Honor, they never connected their knowledge with Monosem. Monosem had been filed, a brochure, in one of the two patents in original prosecution. It was not an issue during the reexaminations and they were not aware -- it was not an issue that was on the table during reexam. There is absolutely no evidence of intent. They couldn't have known of its materiality to the claims.

That is a key for intent.

With the other guy, Gerasimow, from the Case Patent Department, they couldn't link him up with any specific knowledge of what was being claimed or even his knowledge of the relevant features of Monosem that they claim are so relevant.

So intent, Your Honor, we submit, is minuscule. There is nothing. For that reason, on a poorly pled, no evidence case, to let it go to the jury. Given the dangers of unfair prejudice to our client, we respectfully ask the Court to take it up separately.

MR. DURBIN: Judge, many of the issues just described by counsel are factual issues that will be raised during the trial. Monosem is a key piece of invalidating art. Its functionality and its materiality are going to be

addressed in connection with the invalidity proceedings. The question of whether or not it was before the PTO is going to be relevant, to the extent the Court instructs the jury, on due deference to the Patent Office. It is be part of the standard instruction that is not before the PTO. The same judgment doesn't apply. So the issue of what was presented is going to go to the jury. All of the facts are going to be presented to the jury.

It doesn't make sense to me to have two separate trials. I am not sure how we separate them here. To me it seems to be the most economically efficient to do it together. You have these hard issues like intent. The jury can give their view and Your Honor does not have to accept it, but the jury can provide you with their view of whether there is sufficient evidence of intent.

THE COURT: To what extent would you have to recall witnesses?

MR. DURBIN: I think you would have to recall all the experts. You would have to recall or play additional portions of various depositions of the inventors, because the inventors -- for example, the issue that was raised about knowledge and intent. The inventors actually testified that they brought the IP Department, the lawyers, in for a physical viewing of the Monosem in operation. Most of the same people who then were in charge of setting what

prior art was given to the PTO. That evidence is interrelated. Those people are going to testify in the main case and testify again in the second case, either by deposition or live. It is overlapping.

It seems to me the story is so intertwined, their defense is all about materiality, which goes directly to what they are going to say on validity. It is the same position.

MR. BOLAND: I respectfully disagree again.

There may be some overlap on the relevance of Monosem. If
the Court listens to it in a jury trial, with a view toward
taking it up in inequitable conduct on a bench trial, the
Court will hear evidence from the experts on the relevancy
of Monosem as prior art in general. But that would only
serve to streamline any necessary expert testimony on
materiality per se in a separate Bench trial.

As to everything else, in terms of intent, I totally disagree with Mr. Durbin. He mentioned the inventors. The inventors are not accused. The attorneys are accused. I don't see where they would even be called in the jury trial for any other issue.

The pleadings are limited to three people. They are all lawyers. So any issues of intent, I think that is what would be largely put on. We would have rebuttal witnesses and so on. They would be separate. So we don't

agree with the characterization.

THE COURT: If the evidence bears out as you suggested it should, Mr. Boland, it seems to me that it will be rather innocuous and not inflammatory at all. I think a well-instructed jury should be able to deal with the issue. They do it all the time. I will take an advisory view. We will do it all at once.

The next issue that I think I see is at

Paragraph O, Discovery, it is Written Discovery is

Substantially Completed. Is discovery completed or is it
not?

MR. BOLAND: I thought it was complete quite some time ago. What we keep getting is supplementation by Kinze after the close of discovery. It is largely complete in our book, Your Honor. I think there is an issue, under the Section O, Kinze is raising some issue regarding inequitable conduct. I think that's what the first paragraph goes to there. We are simply saying in the second paragraph that this Section 102(g) is related for the reasons we just argued.

THE COURT: Haven't we sort of already dealt with that?

MR. BOLAND: I think we dealt with Section 102(g).

25 THE COURT: Discovery is complete.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. DURBIN: Discovery is complete. Let me add one thing, which is that we discovered an error in our collection of information that has been disclosed to opposing counsel. Specifically, it relates to damages. Apparently at some point in time, we believe that the EdgeVac meters were not sold independently. We discovered recently that in fact a repair code, they created a new code to sell them independently. They have supplemented that information. We told them we will make our person available for a short deposition if they wish to have it. That is the only open issue we are aware of. do have some concerns as raised here about the scope of their discovery responses, but we can take them up at trial as appropriate, where they try to go beyond the scope of their responses. THE COURT: How will they manifest themselves, those concerns? I believe if they try to testify to MR. DURBIN: things that they refused to produce during discovery, I would raise an objection, unless the --THE COURT: Let's see if it becomes a live issue. Do you want to say anything? MR. SCHERLING: Your Honor, just on the individual meter sales Mr. Durbin was referencing, we are

reserving the right to object to those. That is something we can try to address in realtime. We may take a deposition of Mr. Rikaw (phonetic), we may not. That is currently an open issue. We currently don't believe we should. We believe those documents were produced late and should not even be considered.

That is not something that is in the pretrial order. That happened since the pretrial order was submitted. They produced these documents nearly six months after the close of discovery, four months after experts. We think it's late. We will try to work that out with Mr. Durbin in the meantime, and bring it to you if necessary.

Q, Page 16, Case indicates it plans to move, failure to state a claim before trial by a motion for judgment on the pleadings under 12(h)(2). I am not going to entertain any such motion.

THE COURT: That is fine.

Bifurcation, we will not bifurcate willfulness and damages, that's in Paragraph R, as Kinze requests.

Opinions of counsel. This is at Subparagraph R(a), objections to testimony -- let me say this about designations. I don't do deposition designations, objections. You will work them out. Otherwise, it won't come in. It is as simple as that.

All objections to all exhibits are overruled

without prejudice to your ability to raise them again.

Therefore, everything is in. It's been made a part of this pretrial order. It's in. Please do not take up my time and my jury's time by attempting to move these matters individually. They are in.

So there is a Kinze opinion of counsel defense.

Is this something we need to discuss?

MR. DURBIN: It was an objection we raised in response to certain deposition designations and exhibits that were being offered. It was a question of, the plaintiffs attempted to introduce evidence of our potential assertion of the opinion of counsel defense in their case-in-chief. We said, we may or may not do that. It is up to us, not you.

MR. SALIBA: Just this clarification. Kinze objects to the use of exhibits referring to the opinions of counsel.

(Addressing Mr. Durbin) Are you referring to the opinions of counsel that you waived and all the privileged documents attendant thereto, or the point that -- the actual letter in which you produced those exhibits?

MR. DURBIN: My view, Your Honor, if they introduced the opinion letter, they have introduced my opinion of counsel defense. And I have no choice but to assert it and deal with it. I don't think there will be any

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

such objective evidence of invalidity here. We may never need to deal with that issue. If they introduce Mr. Hill's opinion, now I have got to call Mr. Hill, I have got to address it. It's my bell to ring because it is my defense. It is not relevant to prove infringement or invalidity that he gave an opinion. THE COURT: It is not your contention that the defense being asserted, the privilege having been waived, that the opinion letter somehow couldn't come into evidence. MR. DURBIN: Non-privileged? THE COURT: Couldn't come into evidence. If we assert the defense, it should come into evidence. MR. HORWITZ: Your Honor, I think the point is, if we don't raise it as a defense --THE COURT: I got the point. MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, we are probably not going to put the opinions in our case. THE COURT: I wouldn't see why. But go ahead. MR. BOLAND: We are not going to do that. But there is a lot of related things. We have got a whole bunch of discovery, a broad waiver. So we got things involving this Mr. Hill that aren't the opinion letters per se. Our contention is, a lot of them show serious concerns about these patents before and after the opinions were given and

before and after reexam and during reexam. And there is internal Kinze documents. We are going to use that in our case-in-chief to show willfulness. If they want to come back and rely on the opinions, we will deal with the opinions. That is the plan. I don't see how that could be objectionable.

MR. DURBIN: I think that actually relates to a separate issue we did raise, which was, a lot of those documents relate to the prosecution of our own patent. In our view -- yes, we have two of our own patents --

THE COURT: They are not in contention?

MR. BOLAND: No. But they are trying to prove that our patents infringe their patents. Since our patents embody our products, they must infringe their patents. Our point is, that is silly. You need just prove that our products, if you can, the accused device, infringes your patent, and introducing the patent just causes confusion. And a lot of these products led to the patent application process --

THE COURT: It is the accused product to claim.

MR. DURBIN: Right. That was our objection.

MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, we are going to rely -like Dr. Caulfield did in his PI as I explained before,
there is Kinze patents that we are not saying infringe our
patents. We are going to use them as evidence of what the

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

EdgeVac is and does. There is no doubt that Kinze marks its EdgeVac product with this patent number. And there is no doubt that the patent has very relevant information in it about how the meter works. That should be wholly admissible. It is relevant. They are entitled to cross on it. THE COURT: Mr. Durbin, any difficulty with that? MR. DURBIN: It clearly confuses the issue. way the testimony went was they sat an inventor down --THE COURT: Let's anticipate how the testimony is going to go. MR. DURBIN: Much of it is deposition, so we know how it's going to go. What they did is put a person down, had the person --THE COURT: Let me ask you this, to get you to react to Mr. Boland's comment. I won't assume that is exclusive use, but maybe it is, to show how the device works, for instance, the accused product works. MR. DURBIN: I think that the problem with it is that the patents in issue don't claim anything related to the patents, don't use any of the same words. So it will confuse the jury. THE COURT: If it, in your view, as the evidence is developing -- and I want to urge you as well, Mr. Boland,

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

we don't want to confuse the jury, it is not in anybody's interest to do that. MR. BOLAND: We don't to confuse the jury. THE COURT: We don't want to be back here doing this again. MR. BOLAND: We have an obligation to prove the structure and function of the product. THE COURT: My only point is to the extent -you know, the Federal Rules of Evidence are very liberal. They are rules of inclusion, really, not exclusion. I am loathe to exclude, unless we are going to run the risk of confusion or, obviously, if unreliable testimony is coming in. So I am going to be very attentive to objections. Let me tell you both that I really try to keep at arm's-length from the management of your cases. But where I see a risk of confusion, I will jump in sua sponte. Go ahead. MR. BOLAND: We understand. We are planning to use this evidence in a straightforward manner, to help show our case of infringement, Your Honor. That is all. I don't see any risk of confusion. THE COURT: I don't see a difficulty with that. If you do, Mr. Durbin, you will raise it. MR. DURBIN: Correct, Judge.

MR. HORWITZ: Your Honor, I think with the

exchange that we have in place in the order to get exhibits that they are going to use with specific witnesses, if we see something that we think might raise an issue, we will raise it with them and try to head it off.

THE COURT: Which also raises the ministerial point, and I expect that most mornings you will have issues that you want to discuss with me. So we will meet at 8:30, and we will talk about them. To the extent we need to talk about them at the end of the day, the jury leaves at 4:30, and you can anticipate issues that may be contentious, we can talk about it at 4:30 of that same day, obviously, in addition to other opportunities.

I want to urge you to try to keep requests for sidebars to a minimum. Juries don't like them, they really don't.

All right. Let's see now. Lay testimony. Is there an issue?

MR. DURBIN: That was one of our objections. It is pretty specific. There are a handful of folks who were asked questions using claim terms that we don't think there was an adequate foundation laid for it. Specifically, Mr. Tony Bakker is the president of a company that sells Monosem meters. A series of questions were asked him whether certain aspects of the device had anything to do with, quote, release of seeds from the disk. That is language in

the patent at issue here. No foundation he has ever even read the patents. He answered a series of questions saying yes or no to those. We believe that is essentially lay expert testimony without proper foundation and should be excluded.

MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, among the third-party witnesses who were deposed here, we have Mr. Lundie from Deere, that Mr. Durbin deposed and I was there. Mr. Fink from this Krause Company, that Mr. Moore deposed and I was there. We have Mr. Bakker from Monosem that Mr. Moore deposed and I was there. And I crossed them all.

In multiple instances, the Kinze lawyers elicited testimony from these third-party witnesses as to how their meters worked, not just the structure, but would they exist in this part of the meter. With one exception, they are putting in all that testimony. It is not just limited to the structure and it's not just limited to the date. It's how the whole thing works. And the witnesses have personal knowledge of it.

We are not trying to strike all their evidence and block all testimony on functionality.

But when I crossed Bakker and this whole Monosem meter that the Court will see at trial, it's got these openings that are way up here and the seed is outside and Mr. Bakker was telling me that these openings that Kinze

says are so critical, he told me they have nothing to do with the key issue in the case. So they don't like that and they want it out.

If that's out because there is some general rule that a third-party witness can't testify about how the meter works based on firsthand knowledge, that should apply across the board. To simply say, you know, the key testimony that we got that now would be critical for the jury to hear as to why there is no inequitable conduct and how different this meter is and how Kinze's defense on Monosem misunderstands the entire structure and functioning of the device, that would severely prejudice us.

At a minimum, there should be one rule. Either no third-party witness can talk about how the meter works despite the fact that he or she has firsthand knowledge of it or not. But to single out the cross I got from Bakker and say that's inadmissible but everything we want should come in, Your Honor, that is totally unfair.

MR. DURBIN: Judge, I would say we will look at our designations. We might be okay with Rule No. 1. We don't think we designated a lot of function. What we didn't do was use claim terms and ask the witness to opine on these claim terms. The jury will have no idea that Mr. Bakker --

THE COURT: Mr. Boland would concede, that is a difference. Right?

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. BOLAND: I didn't have the patents. wasn't showing him the patents. I wasn't asking him about claim construction. But that is language in the patents --THE COURT: But they are not experts. Why would you need to reference claim terms? MR. BOLAND: How else can you say it, Your Honor, it is the plain and ordinary meaning of the --THE COURT: You talked about functionality. Just say, how does the thing work? MR. BOLAND: That's what I thought I did, Your Honor. THE COURT: Look, work it out. It really sounds to me like more of an issue of form rather than substance. I don't want to raise form over substance. Just see what you can come up with. Opening statements, you want me to confirm it is my practice not to permit use of depositions. I don't know where these things are coming from. Why do you need to use these depositions? Who wants to use deposition testimony? MR. BOLAND: Not me. MR. DURBIN: No. THE COURT: It's a nonissue. My preference with regard to juror notebooks is Each side should prepare 12 copies of the notebook simple.

2.3

you want to have in the jury's hands. That is limited to exhibits that you want to to become facile with. You are going to be flashing a lot of things on the presentation equipment. Obviously, you can't give them all of that in the notebook.

But there must be certain exhibits that you want them to be able to make notes on, to really understand well, obviously, that are admitted and not objected to, that have been discussed with one another.

So that is what a jury notebook in my Court looks like. And they are handed out by Ms. Walker at the beginning of your case-in-chief. And that's it.

With regard to witness notebooks, usually, lawyers in cases of this type, complex civil cases, prepare both direct and cross binders for the witnesses. And I typically like to have one for me and one for my clerk, my law clerk, and in addition, obviously, to opposing counsel and the witness.

MR. DURBIN: Can I ask for one clarification?
THE COURT: Sure.

MR. DURBIN: At the beginning of the Plaintiffs' case-in-chief, the only notebook that will be given will be the Plaintiffs' notebook?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DURBIN: Just to be clear. Thank you.

THE COURT: I have ruled on objections to the exhibits interposed by both parties. I have discussed deposition designations.

Let me suggest to you, counsel, with regard to the preliminary instructions, in our most recent patent case, I forget which one it was, it was nicely done, the way counsel interposed the introduction of the video. I would commend the video to you. Is there objection to it?

MR. BOLAND: We are okay with the video.

MR. DURBIN: Agree, Judge.

THE COURT: That is what I would suggest provides better general guidance regarding patents for juries than that which is suggested in your proposed preliminary jury instructions. In Grape Technology, we just finished that case, and they did a nice job of composing language.

MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, if we are going to use the video, and we would agree to it, if we can have an opportunity to perhaps tweak a couple other paragraphs of the proposal we gave Your Honor and come back with our final proposed --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. DURBIN: I think we can take a look at it.

Your proposal is maybe scrap this whole preliminary and just play the video.

1 THE COURT: Scrap this part of the preliminary 2 that deals with guidance, not the whole preliminary 3 instructions. MR. COTTRELL: Your Honor, if I may, while we 4 5 are on preliminary instructions, I talked to Mr. Horwitz about this, we noticed that the Court adopted an electronic 6 7 media --8 THE COURT: Social media. I would like you to 9 add that language. 10 MR. COTTRELL: We will do that. 11 THE COURT: It is in the Grape -- it's on the 12 website now. 13 MR. COTTRELL: It is, Your Honor. Thank you. 14 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Cottrell. 15 Let's go quickly to voir dire. 16 In the main, the questions are fine. Here are 17 the five that I am intending to strike, absent somebody 18 really getting heartburn and convincing me otherwise. 19 We are at Tab 18. No. 18 proposes to have me 20 inquire, have you or any member of your immediate family 21 ever had education or experience in engineering, farming, as a mechanic or in any other technical field? 22 23 The basic premise that I operate under in terms 24 of selecting a jury is this: Can the juror sit fairly and 25 impartially and judge the facts? Not whether they have an

engineering degree, a law degree, whether they are homemakers, registered nurses, technicians. Whatever the case may be. So if you can tell me how a background in engineering, farming, or as a mechanic or other technical field may or may not inform that person's ability to sit and be fair, and therefore it needs to be inquired, I am willing to hear.

MR. DURBIN: Your Honor, I think specifically with respect to farming, what we might find is there are some people who are very familiar with one brand or one part of the other, one type of mechanism, something that is specifically in this case, and already has a predisposition. If we don't ask the question, we won't every know.

I imagine there is a good chance that everybody who is in farming would say no. But some people might say yes and that might be brought into it.

THE COURT: Do you concur in that?

MR. BOLAND: Yes, in general, Your Honor.

Because I think here one issue will be is if a juror is a farmer, farmers often have very strong brand loyalty.

Either they are a Deere person or a Case person or something else. But I am looking at 14, and that sort of picks up the farming.

THE COURT: I will make both inquiries. I was intending to ask 14. That is, have you or any member of

1 your immediate family ever owned or used farm equipment.

But I will inquire have you or any member of your immediate family ever had an educational experience in farming.

MR. DURBIN: Thank you, Judge.

I am not going to ask about law degrees or other legal training. That is No. 19. That is going to be apparent from the information you will get prior to jury selection. It will be available the Wednesday before trial. But you can get it, and you will from Ms. Walker get it on the morning of, because that will be the most recent list that will have really minimal information. It will have name. It will have the section of the state from which the person hails. Usually, it has occupation, I think marital status, and age on there as well.

No. 23, I don't intend to ask, nor do I intend to ask No. 24.

I think 21 sort of picks up No. 24, 21 being have you or anyone in your immediate family ever applied for or obtained a patent in the U.S. or abroad. We could add to that -- it says "applied for or obtained." You get a yes, you will get a chance to follow up at sidebar with me. On all of these questions to which a putative jury has answered a general yes, we will call up after I do the general questions and we will rotate. And you will get a chance to interpose additional interrogatories on the record.

While I am on that, we will entertain cause motions at that time. Not in front of the juror. We will invite the juror to go back. I will ask for cause, and I will rule.

In all likelihood there will be a number of occasions where I will sua sponte dismiss the jury for cause. I will give a chance to object. It usually comes up in a situation where there is a child care issue, someone is self-employed, just got a job, is going to miss a final exam, that kind of thing. And in this economy, I have found that I have been required to act more frequently on causes for economic reasons than I used to earlier in my clear.

Do we have this on disk?

MR. BOLAND: We can easily submit it.

THE COURT: Go ahead and submit it. I am going to reposition 25 to follow No. 20. Do you hold any opinions about the U.S. PTO, to follow the Question No. 20, that patent applications are examined --

No. 29 will be taken up in another question.

No. 29 is have you or any immediate member of your family ever been involved in a patent dispute? I am going to ask them about litigation generally and involvement in litigation. I think that will cover that.

Other than that, the questions are fine, other than those.

So a few additional things.

Counsel, when you have occasion to object, please rise, state your objection by referencing the substantive reason for which you are objecting, rather than the rule number. Don't argue the objection. I endeavor to rule promptly. If I don't, I will call you to sidebar myself. If I have ruled, and you strongly disagree with it, and you want to make your record, get me is to sidebar. Not always easy. But you got to get me to sidebar. It's your job. I usually go.

We turn on the white-noise machine. I try not to yell above it. That is the way things go around here.

Approaching a witness, just ask one time, please, on each witness. Then you have free leave. You are automatically given free leave. Just keep going back and forth as much as you need to.

Moving around the courtroom, it is a U.S. courtroom. I expect your conduct to be very formal. I am very formal, unlike sometimes I have been here today, I sort of morph into a different person when I don the black robe. It is not "black robe disease." It is simply a requirement that lawyers conduct themselves in my view in an appropriate way in a United States courtroom.

When you want to move about, ask for permission.

This is not the "wild west" of my colleagues -- and they

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

will get on me -- on the Bankruptcy Court across the way. We used to do first-days here. In any event, they do a great job. We have great bankruptcy judges in this district. MR. DURBIN: May I raise a question? THE COURT: Yes. MR. DURBIN: We put in the pretrial order that for dividing time we should assume six hours a day. Mr. Horwitz has told me that is not always --THE COURT: The multiplier I strive for, the time I strive for is six, but the multiplier should be five and a half, because what happens is, inevitably, it is usually my fault, we end up running over a little bit on the breaks. Just by loose calculation I think it comes down to five and a half. I do try to adhere to the 15 minutes that I allot in the morning and in the afternoon. But I think it really comes out to more like five and a half. We will divide it evenly, unless there is some reason that one of you thinks it shouldn't be divided evenly. THE COURT: Is there any problem with that? MR. BOLAND: That is fine, Your Honor. THE COURT: You will keep one another's time, You are the best timekeepers that I have. Ms. Walker will back you up. We should do time checks

periodically. I will rely on Delaware counsel in that

regard, if there is an issue that is arising. Please don't lose track of your time. Fortunately, it has only happened once. But it did happen in a patent matter where a plaintiff ran out of time, because I enforce it rigorously, they couldn't make certain proofs by way of evidentiary presentation that they needed to make. It shouldn't happen. You guys are too experienced and too good at what you do to let that happen.

MR. DURBIN: May I, Judge?

Despise my wise local counsel's direction not to do so, I am going to ask if there is any opportunity for us to have additional time.

THE COURT: No. And he was very wise in that regard.

You may be interested to know that we, in 2010, this Court assumed in the country the number-one per Judge, that was on four Judges, we have now ended our fourth year with three Judges and now one Magistrate-Judge, and we are No. 2 in terms of gross filings. So I don't have additional time, I just don't have it.

I don't see on the horizon a quick resolution, quite frankly, to the filling of our vacation.

My wise Chief Deputy says settlement. It may be the case, and I do usually inquire as to whether there have been additional discussions or whether they are ongoing.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

2.3

24

25

MR. BOLAND: Your Honor, as a matter of fact, right before the holidays, CNH made a concrete demand to Kinze to try to settle the case. But we haven't heard back. We asked for a response by today so we would perhaps be in a position to say something to Your Honor that there might be some light or not. But we didn't hear back. THE COURT: Mr. Durbin. MR. DURBIN: We would love to talk about settlement. That was a starter. Perhaps we could have some continued conversations outside the courtroom. THE COURT: You are saying the demand --MR. DURBIN: It was more of a demand for judgment, from our perspective. THE COURT: Obviously, counsel, you are sophisticated lawyers. You know you can talk on your own. You have got sophisticated businesspeople on either side of the issue. Have the businesspeople been speaking to one another? MR. DURBIN: No, Judge. MR. BOLAND: I would like it. I think we would both like it to come to that, if there is some areas that would be worthwhile. So we have an open mind, Your Honor. As in any case, our client feels that it's reasonable. THE COURT: I will say this to the in-house folks who are here. I have been doing this now more than 12

years, and have seen over that time rather good results when, with all due respect to outside counsel, businesspeople have been left to their own devices, without the aid and benefit of lawyers. This is not in any way to diminish the value that lawyers bring to this process.

But it has been my experience on more than one occasion, particularly when I have worn the hat of neutral which I do from time to time -- I am not offering that in this case -- where people who really understand their business much better than any neutral can, much better than the best outside counsel can, get together in a room and hash it out. Just a thought.

I think that exhausts my list of issues. Mr. Boland.

MR. BOLAND: I think one minor issue, Your

Honor. Perhaps Mr. Scherling can raise it. It is regarding

access under the productive order for Ms. Lawrence.

MR. SCHERLING: Ms. Emily Lawrence is in the courtroom today. She has been observing for Case today. We have been trying to work this out with opposing counsel -- so far we haven't been able to -- to allow Ms. Lawrence to have access to highly confidential material under the protective order that so far is attorneys' eyes only. We would request that Ms. Lawrence be allowed to see such highly confidential Kinze materials.

2.3

She is a managing attorney for litigation. She is new in the position. She is managing attorney for litigation. She is not involved in any patent prosecution per case. She doesn't work with the engineers. She is not involved in product development or intellectual property. She oversees litigation. That is her job, to oversee the litigation, work with us, and report to supervisors or her superiors as appropriate.

She is not in any way involved in what is a touchstone frequently for in-house counsel having access to highly confidential materials, which is competitive decision-making. She is not involved in that kind of stuff, no patent prosecuting marketing, business, not that type of thing.

THE COURT: She has no business clients in the company?

MR. SCHERLING: Correct. She does not work with patent prosecutors, marketing, advice on business initiatives, things like that.

THE COURT: I ask because I used to wear a duly hat when I was at Hercules. I would manage some litigation, but I was also involved in giving business advice for a set list of in-house clients that I had.

MR. SCHERLING: Her job is managing attorneys for litigation. She is in a separate building from

engineers, a separate building from marketing. She is in a different country from where the planters are made. They are actually manufactured in Canada.

She would keep the information on her own laptop computer, not own a server that is common with anyone else.

Any copies would be locked up.

THE COURT: What about conferring with general counsel, her boss?

MR. SCHERLING: Her boss, her immediate boss is a man named Mr. Conrack (phonetic). He is also not directly responsible for any competitive decision making.

THE COURT: Is he the GC?

MR. SCHERLING: He is not the GC. They have a GC above him.

THE COURT: She must have at least a dotted line to the GC.

MR. SCHERLING: She has a dotted line to the GC. He has temporarily overall responsibility for things that do involve the IP group. But he is not actively involved on a day-to-day basis, as I understand. Importantly here, Ms. Lawrence would be where the access ends. She has actually signed the acknowledgment under the protective order. It would just be for her to see it. She might advise, for example, Mr. Conrack, for example, or the GC, Mr. Goyne (phonetic), as to roughly the status of the case, here is

what is going on, Kinze has made a settlement offer, whatever. Here is how I assess the case. But without giving the highly confidential information.

It is important for her to be able to do that to relate to the company. And also, she is going to be involved in helping us prepare for trial. It is important in that respect because she is managing a tray for litigation. It is a big enough company. We have people that do that.

THE COURT: Sure. I worked for a company that size, probably bigger at the time, who had that function.

MR. DURBIN: We proposed a couple things here.

We said, can you tell us exactly what it is she needs to see so we can look at it, and propose some kind of mutuality, because we don't have anybody we can talk to on highly confidential information. They haven't been willing to do either of those.

My concern with Ms. Lawrence is, you hit on it, which is that the information, she was asked, they asked whether she could have the information so she could then understand what it is and report to management. Those same management people, I remember one of them, Mr. Goyne, he is one of the people that decided to sue us. He is the kind of people that make the kind of competitive situations that are at issue here.

2.3

If the fact of the matter is not a peep of what she learns will go to those people, they already have people that can manage that. We have shared information with the entire team here. They can summarize expert reports and damage information without disclosing confidential information to the decision-makers. It sounds like Ms.

Lawrence is not the decision-maker. The question is why do we need to share our information with one more person? If she is not going to share it, she just creates a risk for us.

THE COURT: Here is what I have heard, one of the last statements I heard was to assist in the preparation of the case. It would have to be under circumstances where she is not going to share.

Your reaction?

MR. DURBIN: Then if she is not going to be advising management based on what she learns, which I thought she would do, what I would ask for is a list of the kind of things she wants. There is a list of stuff there is no reason for her to see. There is not lost profits in this case. There is a ton of information that she could share, that I don't know why she would need access to it. It wouldn't be relevant.

I am not sure what they want to show her.

MR. SCHERLING: Your Honor, we think under the

circumstances where she signed the acknowledgment, she would be giving her word that nothing would be bleeding past her, no highly confidential information going past here, she should be entitled to see everything, including Kinze's financial information. That is very pertinent to Case, even though not lost profits, it goes to the number of units sold, the revenue they generated, their profits. That is important to assess that information independently. We certainly are advising them. It is her job to manage litigation. For her to be able to do that, I think she needs access to that information.

MR. DURBIN: I don't see how they are being handicapped in any way. We don't have anybody like that.

THE COURT: You just happen not to be structured that way. I guess, having been there, it sort of resonates with me that the client would want to have someone from within its own ranks, someone with whom they have implicit -- not that they don't trust their outside counsel implicitly -- but have a different or at least an even stronger relationship, for lack of a better word.

I can't think of something appropriate to say, why, given the constraints of her ability to share, in any way risks prejudice to Kinze's competitive position.

I am going to permit her to have the access. But it must not go beyond, and it must be for purposes of

assisting in the preparation of this case. MR. SCHERLING: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. BOLAND: Plaintiffs have no more issues. THE COURT: Mr. Durbin. MR. DURBIN: No, Judge. THE COURT: All right, counsel. Thanks for your time. We will see you along the way. (Concluded at 12:45 p.m.) Reporter: Kevin Maurer